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Resumo
Virtualização é uma palavra em voga no mundo das tecnologias de informação. Com a
promessa de reduzir o constante crescimento das infra-estruturas informáticas dentro de
um centro de processamento de dados, aliado a outros aspectos importantes como disponi-
bilidade e escalabilidade, as tecnologias de virtualização têm vindo a ganhar popularidade,
não só entre os profissionais de tecnologias de informação mas também administradores e
directores. No entanto, o aumento da adopção do uso desta tecnologia expõe o sistema a
novas preocupações de segurança que normalmente são negligenciadas.
Esta tese apresenta o estado da arte das soluções actualmente mais usadas de virtualização
de servidores e também um estudo literário dos vários problemas de segurança das tecno-
logias de virtualização. Estes problemas não são específicos em termos de produto, e são
abordados no âmbito de tecnologias de virtualização. No entanto, nesta tese é feita uma
análise de vulnerabilidades de duas das mais conhecidas soluções de virtualização: VM-
ware EXS e Xen. No final, são descritas algumas soluções para melhorar a segurança de
acesso a banco online e de comercio electrónico, usando virtualização.
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Abstract
Virtualization is a hype word in the IT world. With the promise to reduce the ever-growing
infrastructure inside data centers allied to other important concerns such as availability and
scalability, virtualization technology has been gaining popularity not only with IT profes-
sionals but also among administrators and directors as well. The increasingly rising rate of
the adoption of this technology has exposed these systems to new security concerns which
in recent history have been ignored or simply overlooked.
This thesis presents an in depth state of art look at the currently most used server virtua-
lization solutions, as well as a literature study on various security issues found within this
virtualization technology. These issues can be applied to all the current virtualization tech-
nologies available without focusing on a specific solution. However, we do a vulnerability
analysis of two of the most known virtualization solutions: VMware ESX and Xen. Fi-
nally, we describe some solutions on how to improve the security of online banking and
e-commerce, using virtualization.
Keywords: Virtualization, Security, Threats, Online Banking
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Virtualization has profoundly changed the information technology (IT) industry in different
areas such as network, operating systems, applications or storage. Virtualization is no lon-
ger a subject only IT people know about it. It has gained space on the administrators and
directors vocabulary. Companies have realized that most of their systems were running at
ratios of 10 percent or less of utilization, yet these systems continue to require space, po-
wer and cooling system as any other machine. Reducing these requirements would have a
direct impact in reducing the IT budget and environment cares as the carbon footprint. Vir-
tualization technology was the solution found by many companies, moving this technology
into the mainstream. According to a recent IDC survey [2], companies that have deployed
virtualization could see a return of investment of 472 percent in less than a year. The increa-
sed utilization and consolidation of x86 architectures had an important role for this as well.
Many companies use this architecture because it has lower cost compared with others in
the market. However, this architecture had historically hardware support issues for virtua-
lization which significant degrade the performance of the virtual machine (VM) comparing
with the same system running on a physical host. In order to solve this problem, Intel and
AMD implemented architectural extensions to directly support virtualization in hardware.
This overcomes the classical virtualization limitations of the x86 architecture, improving
important aspects such as performance and scalability making x86 server virtualization a
keystone of most IT consolidation projects.
The increasing investment and implementation of virtualization is comparable to the imple-
mentation of internet in companies at the end of the last decade. However, in the same way,
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security was not the top priority, although IT administrators are now more sensible to this
subject. The risks of this new technology are something discussed almost only at security
events such as Black Hat and it continues to be out of the focus of many references and
consultant companies that implement this technology. Virtualization has been presented to
companies as an out-of-the-box solution that companies do not have to worry about, as if it
was physical machines with the advantages that the hardware virtualized does not “crash”
as the physical ones. There are still some myths to break when talking about virtualization
security and these myths happen because, as other myths, there is not much information
about it. Some people assume that having, for instance, 4 virtual machines running on a
physical machine is the same as having 4 physical machines and so the concerns should be
the same (e.g. only install patches on the operating system inside the virtual machine). Per-
haps this myth exists because there is a common sense that hypervisors are impenetrable,
which is false as we are going to see later in this thesis. Some IT directors are not aware of
the security level while using virtualization. For instance, with virtualization it is possible
to pause or take a snapshot of a virtual machine that has sensible information as cryptogra-
phic keys or password in memory and most companies do not look to these snapshots as
critical assets as the running virtual machines.
This thesis presents a study about virtualization, focusing in security problems as the ones
described on the previous paragraph. It covers both server and desktop environments and
virtualization software. Regarding servers, we have conducted a vulnerability study, com-
paring two virtualization solutions, while for the desktops we have made a study about how
virtualization can be used to improve security for online banking and e-commerce.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
• We create a document with detailed information regarding virtualization concepts
that can be used as reference in courses such as Secure Software Systems. Currently
there exist much documentation about virtualization, but normally it focuses only on
specific product.
• We analyze the different aspects of virtualization security. There are few books and
documents dedicated to this subject and our contribution is to add more value on this
subject.
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• We make a vulnerability study of two of the most used enterprise virtualization pro-
ducts and compare them in the number of vulnerabilities and the impact those vulne-
rabilities have.
• We study some solutions which demonstrate that virtualization products can help
people facing some of the current security threats such as phishing attacks. Accor-
ding to the website PhishTank, in June 2009 there were validated more than 6000 new
phishing attacks [3]. With our contribution, the user would not be affected by these
types of attacks and would increase the security of online banking and e-commerce.
1.3 Document Structure
The outline of the remainder of this thesis is as follows: in Section 2 we describe the
background of virtualization, doing a resume of its history and describing each component,
types and benefits of virtualization; in Section 3 we present the state of art, describing
the most current used virtualization products; in Section 4 we do an analysis of security
vulnerabilities in virtualization, presenting some of the security breaks that can happen in
virtualization and doing a vulnerability analysis of two currently used enterprise virtualiza-
tion products (VMware ESX and Xen); in Section 5 we present two solutions for phishing
attacks and future directions for a third solution that could be implemented by the banks;
finally, Section 6 concludes.
3
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 History
"Virtual machines have finally arrived" [4], said Robert P. Goldberg in 1974. Although this
is, in fact, our current reality, it seems to have been the reality of the last 35 years with
the slow adoption of virtual machines. Back in 1960s, virtualization was better known as
time-sharing. Christopher Strachey, Professor of Computation at Oxford University and the
first director of the Programming Research Group published a paper titled “Time Sharing
in Large Fast Computers” [5]. His paper, as he refers later in a letter, “was mainly about
multi-programming (to avoid waiting for peripherals) although it did envisage this going
on at the same time as a programmer was debugging his program at a console. I did not
envisage the sort of console system which is now so confusingly called time sharing." [6].
The multi-programming technique allows different users to execute jobs simultaneously.
This was possible for one job to take advantage of the CPU, while another is not using the
CPU, because it is waiting for an I/O device to store or retrieve data. From among some
computers that took advantage of this technique, two are considered part of the evolutionary
lineage of virtualization: Atlas and IBM’s M44/44X.
The Atlas computer [7] project was run by the Department of Electrical Engineering at
Manchester University and funded by Ferranti Limited. It became operational in 1962 and
it was considered the fastest computer in the world, until the release of the CDC 6600 in
1964. The Atlas Computer was the first supercomputer to take advantage of time-sharing,
multi-programming and shared peripheral control. It introduced a component called super-
visor [8], which managed important resources, such as the processing time of the computer
and passed special instructions called extracodes, which would help it to manage the com-
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puter environment for the user program’s instruction. The name supervisor remembers the
actual name hypervisor, and in fact, we can consider supervisor as its roots. Trying to
compete with Atlas Computer, IBM created the M44/44X at the IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Center in Yorktown, New York. The central principle of its architecture was a set
of virtual machines, one for each user. The M44, the real machine, was a modified version
of IBM 7044 and the 44X was each virtual machine with an experimental image of the
7044 [9, 10]. However, the incomplete implementation of the underlying hardware simu-
lation by the M44/44X virtual machine made this project to fail, but soon IBM released its
System/360 mainframe.
Virtualization is best known to have been started with the development of the System/360
mainframe, by IBM Corporation. One of the problems presented at the time was the high
cost of the machines, which were inefficiently used by people. The main operations were
made by using key punches and submitting batch jobs. Engineers were trying to let multiple
users to come into the system, by making these batches more interactive. Implementing a
time-sharing system at the time for multiple users was not an easy thing to do. For that very
reason, IBM’s engineering team in Cambridge, Massachusetts presented an idea that would
provide each user a virtual machine (VM), with a simple operating system, which only has
to support one user. Robert Creasy and Les Comeau from IBM started to developed CP-
40 in 1964. This operating system was designed for the System/360 mainframe and was
the first step to create virtual machines on these systems. It could support up to fourteen
simultaneous virtual machines.
Each virtual machine ran in a mode called “problem state”, where privileged instructions
(e.g. I/O operations) would cause exceptions, which were intercepted by the control pro-
gram and simulated. It was replaced in 1965 by CP-67 with the System/360 model 67. This
new hypervisor was the first fully virtualized virtual machine operating system and because
of this, it is referred in many documentation as the beginning of virtualization. It provided
CMS to each mainframe user. CMS stands initially for Cambridge Monitor System, then
it was designed as Console Monitor System, but at the end it was renamed to Conversatio-
nal Monitor System. This CSM was a lightweight single-user operating system supporting
time-sharing capabilities. The S/360-67 had a new component called the "Blaauw Box"
(designed by Gerrit Blaauw) which implemented virtual memory. CP-67 had the func-
tionality of memory sharing across VMs while providing each user with his own virtual
memory space. The advantages were impressive. It was possible to implement test plat-
forms for software development and testing in a much more efficient way. In addition,
it increased the debugging efficiency, since it was possible to analyze the virtual memory
when the application failed. VM technology stayed as an internal project inside IBM until
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1972, when it became a commercial product. One year after, Madnick and Donovan [11]
released the first security analysis about virtual machines.
Even so, during these years, VM technology was an important technology in the mainframe
world. IBM continued its VM technology on the System/360 and System/370, which ap-
peared in 1970. Nowadays, it continues on the IBM’s 64-bit z/Architecture with their
z/VM. Until late 90’s, some companies released their Virtual Machine, but none with conti-
nuous success. In 1998, in California, it was founded VMWare. Their first product was
released one year after and has remained one of the most used products on the market, VM-
Ware Workstation [12]. In 2001 their first server edition of VMware ESX 1.0 (Elastic Sky
X) was released. Beside VMware, some other companies, such as Sun, Microsoft, Parallels
and Citrix, have released their virtualization products that have wide acceptance, some of
them as a commercial product, other as an open source solution.
2.2 What is Virtualization
Defining virtualization is not an easy task because as we will see later, there are different
types of virtualization and a definition that would be adequate for all is not easy to achieve.
Singh [13] describes virtualization as “framework or methodology of dividing the resources
of a computer into multiple execution environments, by applying one or more concepts or
technologies such as hardware and software partitioning, time-sharing, partial or complete
machine simulation, emulation, quality of service, and many others”. However, this defini-
tion leaves out cases as network virtualization, application virtualization or storage virtua-
lization. Kiyanclar [14] describes virtualization as “the faithful reproduction of an entire
architecture in software, which provides the illusion of a real machine to all software run-
ning above it”. Most of the definitions are correct if we only consider server virtualization,
nevertheless, I adapted Singh’s definition saying that:
Definition. Virtualization is as a framework dividing the resources of the device from the
execution environment, allowing environment plurality by using one or more techniques
such as time-sharing, emulation, partitioning.
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2.3 Popek and Goldberg
The classical requirements for virtualization provided by Popek and Goldberg, in 1974, on
their article “Formal requirements for Virtualizable Third Generation Architectures” [15]
is considered the most common qualitative benchmark and can be used as a criterium to
judge virtualization variants.The original analysis by Popek and Goldberg was for third-
generation computer systems, such as the IBM System/370, the Honeywell 6000, and the
Digital PDP-10, but it still holds for present-day machines. On the article, the authors
generalized the requirements that the software that provides the abstraction of a virtual
machine must guarantee. These requirements can be divided in three:
• Efficiency: The majority of operations must be performed on actual resources rather
than being intercepted by the virtualization layer. Sometimes this is referred to as
Performance.
• Resource Control: The virtualization layer should be in complete control of the
virtualized resources. It should be impossible to bypass the virtualization without
control. Sometimes this is referred to as Safety.
• Equivalence: A program running on a virtual resource must exhibit identical behavior
as if it was running on the actual resource. Sometimes this is referred to as Fidelity.
According to Golberg et al., the problem at the time that virtual machine monitor (VMM)
developers must deal with is to conceive a VMM that would satisfy the three previous
conditions when operating within the characteristics of the Instruction Set Architecture
(ISA) on the target hardware platform. The ISA can be classified into three groups of
instructions:
• Privileged: Instructions that trap only if the processor is in user mode and has no trap
if it is in supervisor mode.
• Control Sensitive: Instructions that try to change the configuration of actual resources
in the hardware platform
• Behavior: Instructions where the configurations of resources will have an effect on
the behavior or results.
VMMs must work with each group of instructions while guaranteeing the three initial re-
quirements of efficiency, resource control and equivalence. In Popek and Goldberg termi-
nology, a VMM should satisfy all three properties, however some of the current VMMs (as
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type 2 hypervisor, described in Chapter 2.4 on page 11 ) only satisfy the Equivalence and
Resource Control properties. Moreover, they do it by taking advantage of the emulation,
isolation, allocation and encapsulation functions of the VMMs in order to manage the guest
operating system and hardware platform.
Emulation represents an important component for a guest operating system that will run on
the VM. The VMM has to supply a complete hardware environment (e.g. CPU, Memory,
disk) designated as virtual machine. The goal would be that any VM should be available for
any application or operating system running inside and should be the most transparent to
them, make it unaware that they are sharing hardware resources. Emulation is an important
component to satisfy the equivalence requirement.
Another important function of a VMM is to allocate platform resources in an unfailin-
gly way to all the VMs that it manages. In order to have an optimize performance and
correct service levels as it is required, platform resources (e.g. network I/O, processing,
memory) must be balanced correctly. Allocation is an important component to satisfy re-
source control and since it is also related with performance then it can be considered as
a component to satisfy the efficiency requirement. Isolation, by the other hand, ensures
security and reliability of the environment, by making each virtual machine separated and
isolated using hardware abstraction. This allows total independence and isolation to each
VM from operations on other virtual machines. A fault on one of the VMs should not affect
the others on the same VMM, allowing a high level of security and availability.
The Popek and Goldberg requirements did not address encapsulation, which is a com-
ponent of the VMM process. Encapsulation enables the portability of each software stack
(operating system and application), allowing it to be copied or moved from one hardware
platform (running the VMM) to another. With this function, it is possible, for instance, to
do live migration of running VMs [16].
2.4 CPU Virtualization
The x86 architecture is the most used CPU architecture in enterprise datacenters today, and
virtualization can take benefits of that. The Intel 80286 chipset, introduced on February
1982, was the first of the x86 family to provide two main methods of addressing memory:
real mode and protected mode. Later, in 1985, with the 80386 chipset, a third mode was
introduced called virtual 8086 mode (also called virtual real mode, V86-mode or VM86).
The VM86 allowed multiple real mode processes to be run simultaneously while taking full
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advantage of the 80386 protection mechanism. Real mode soon became obsolete because
it had some disadvantages, such as it was limited to a one megabyte of memory and only
one program can be run at a time. The same way, virtual mode was locked in at 16-bit
and became obsolete with the high use of 32-bit operating system. Protected mode, by
the other hand, is the natural 32-bit environment of the 80386 processor providing many
features in order to support multitasking, such as hardware support for virtual memory and
segmenting processor.
Protected mode in the x86 family uses 4 privilege levels, numbered from 0 to 3. Sometimes
these levels are designated as rings, and the term comes from the MULTICS system [17], in
which privilege levels were illustrated as a set of concentric rings. We are going to use the
term “ring” as level, because it is a terminology more used. System memory is divided into
segments and each segment is assigned and dedicated to a particular ring. The processor
uses the privilege ring to decide what actions can be done with the code or data within a
segment. As it shows in the Figure 2.1, Ring 0 is considered the innermost ring, which has
total control of the hardware while Ring 3 is the outermost ring and has restricted access.
Figure 2.1: Privilege rings of the x86 architecture. High privilege:0; Low privilege: 3
The supervisor mode is the execution mode on an x86 processor with unrestricted access,
which enables the executions of all instruction, including I/O and memory management
operations, which are privileged instructions. Operating system runs on this supervisor
mode, normally on the ring 0. However if this ring is compromised, it will have direct
impacts on the ring 3 (user mode). The idea of having isolated ring 0 for each virtualized
guest is that if one of the ring 0 of a virtualized guest is affected by, for instance, a failure
it will not have impact the ring 0 of others virtualized guest. In order to do this, it is
necessary to make this ring 0 closer to the guest, residing in either ring 1 or ring 2 for x86
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architectures. However, the further it goes from the real ring 0, the more distant is from
executing direct hardware operations, resulting in a loss of performance and independence.
Virtualization moves ring 0 up one level in the privilege rings model and places the virtual
machine monitor in the next higher privilege ring. This will be the ring 0 and it is upon
this the guest operating systems runs, while the VMM handles the interaction with the
underlying hardware platform. VMMs can be classified in two types:
• Type 1: This type is also called as native or bare-metal because the hypervisor soft-
ware runs on top of the host’s hardware on the real ring 0 (Figure 2.2a). A guest
operating system thus runs on another level above the hypervisor, allowing for true
isolation of each virtual machine. This is the classic VM architecture. An example
of this implementation is the VMware ESX Server and Xen.
• Type 2: This type is also called hosted VMM because the hypervisor software runs
within a normal host operating system already installed, usually in ring 3 (Figure
2.2b). This type of VMMhas a lower performance than the other type because factors
as calls to the hardware must traverse many diverse layers before the operations are
returned to the guest operating system. Examples of this implementation include
VMware Workstation, Sun VirtualBox and Parallels Workstations.
(a) Type 1 Hypervisor/VMM (b) Type 2 Hypervisor/VMM
Figure 2.2: The two types of Hypervisors/VMMs
It is important to clarify that the term Hypervisor has the same meaning as VMM.
Privileged instructions trap when they are called from user mode. When called from super-
visor mode (kernel mode), they do not trap. A trap passes control to a trap-handler, located
in the kernel, so that processor mode changes. A sensitive instruction is an instruction
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that reads from or writes to memory locations or sensitive registers. All sensitive instruc-
tions have to trap on a virtualizable architecture and therefore, in this context, sensitive
instructions can be seen as subset of privileged instructions. A VM cannot access hard-
ware directly without passing the hypervisor, which is responsible for maintaining control
over sensitive instruction and the hardware. When a VM tries to access sensitive data, the
instruction is trapped and control is passed to the hypervisor. This happens because VMs
runs in user mode but if the guest OS attempts to access sensitive data, a trap will occur.
Then, the hypervisor, which is running in supervisor mode, it will catch this trap, inspect
the state of the guest OS that cause it and emulate the behavior that would occur if the guest
OS was running on a real machine. The hypervisor will then resume the VM, allowing the
executing to continue. This method is called “trap and emulate”.
The Popek & Goldberg requirements are satisfied by this approach as long as the processor
is guaranteed to trap whenever any privileged operation is attempted in user mode. Howe-
ver x86 architectures does not guarantee this, since there are 17 sensitive non privileged
instructions that disables “trap and emulate”. The control is not passed to the hypervi-
sor when these sensitive instructions are called and so, the hypervisor cannot emulate the
expected behavior.
According to Smith and Nair [18], the 17 sensitive non privileged instructions fall into two
categories:
• Protection system references: These instructions reference address relocation system,
memory system or storage protection system. The problem is the possibility of a vir-
tual machine to access locations outside its virtual memory. An example presented
by the authors is the MOVE instruction, which moves a value from general-purpose
register to the CS register, the control register that specified the current privilege ring
number in bits. An instruction such as move ax,cs, when executed in the user
mode disallows the CS register to be loaded. This happens to offer some protec-
tion, but which makes it not well virtualizable is that instead of generate a trap, the
instruction generates a no-op. The instructions in this category are:
CALL: Call procedure
JMP: Jump
INT n: Software Interrupt
LAR: Load access rights
LSL: Load segment limit
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MOV: Move data between general-purpose registers or between memory and
general-purpose/segment registers. It can also move immediates to general-
purpose registers
POP: Pop off of stack
PUSH: Push onto stack
RET: Return
STR: Store task register
VERR: Verify segment for reading
VERW: Verify segment for writing
• Sensitive register instructions: These instructions read or change resource-related
registers and/or memory locations, such as a clock register or interrupt registers. The
authors detail the example of the POPF instruction. POPF pops the flag registers
from a stack held in memory. One of the flag registers is the interrupt-enable flag
(IF), which can only be modified in privilege mode. The problem happens when the
guest OS requires that the IF bit be changed and since it is running in the user mode
under the VM, then the IF bit cannot be changed. This can lead the guest OS to take
erroneous action because the flag bit was not set as expected. These instructions are:
PUSHF: Push EFLAGS onto stack
POPF: Pop EFLAGS from stack
SGDT: Store global descriptor table register
SIDT: Store interrupt descriptor table register
SLDT: Store local descriptor table register
On the paper, the authors describe 18 instructions, which are the ones specified above and
SMSW (store machine status word). However, in literature about virtualization it is only
mentioned 17 sensitive, unprivileged instructions are considered. We believe the SMSW
instruction was deprecated since it is only provided for backwards compatibility with the
Intel 286 processor.
On the x86 architecture, the operating system normally runs in ring 0, because it is the
highest privilege level, which provides total access to platform resources, like CPU and
memory. Individual applications usually run in ring 3 in User Mode, with restricted access.
When we add virtualization on this scheme, what normally happens is that VMM runs in
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ring 0, since it must have privileged control of platform resources and the guest operating
system goes to ring 1 or ring 3.
In order to overcome the limitation of implement CPU virtualization on x86 architectures,
some techniques such as direct execution combined with fast binary translation and para-
virtualization [19].
Binary translation (BT) is not a new technique and can be use for various purposes such
as migrations between different architectures [20, 21]. The combination of direct execu-
tion with BT was an idea developed by VMware to be used for CPU virtualization. This
technique allows running supervisor mode code controlled by the binary translator. The
translator replaces the privileged code into a similar block, patching the sensitive, unpri-
vileged instructions. This translated block can then run directly on the CPU and they are
cached by the BT system in a trace cache so they can be used on subsequent executions.
Using BT, only the sensitive instructions like POPF are replaced while the normal instruc-
tions are executed unchanged. This binary translation is only applied when the code first
executes [19].
Paravirtualization uses a different approach to overcome the x86 virtualization issue. With
paravirtualization, the nonvirtualizable instructions are replaces with virtualizable equiva-
lent ones. This requires the guest OS to be changed although most of the normal applica-
tions remain unchanged. One difference with the BT approach is that in paravirtualization,
the guest OS knows that it is running in a virtual environment, while using BT the guest OS
have the illusion that is running on a real machine. The paravirtual hypervisor is smaller
and easier to implement containing only a small interface for the 17 sensitive, unprivileged
instructions and then is more trustworthy than one using BT and similar to a VMM using
“trap and emulate”.
The second generation of hardware virtualization (Intel VT [22] and AMD-V [23]) was
designed with the goal of eliminate the need for BT and paravirtualization on the x86
architecture. The CPU creates containers and introduces new modes of operations that can
distinguish if the CPU is real or virtual. VMM runs the highest privilege container which
is commonly designed as ring -1. Guests run within a lower privileged container, although
conceptually is considered a ring 0. This allows guest OS to run at their normal ring and
only leaving when the guest tries to execute a privilege or sensitive instructions which will
trap to the VMM. This can be seen as “trap and emulate” and therefore, all security issues
related with it can be also applied to hardware virtualization.
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2.5 Memory Virtualization
Normal operating system use page tables to translate virtual addresses into physical ad-
dresses. Virtual machines brought new challenges regarding memory virtualization since
memory is going to be shared although isolation as to be guaranteed. We can consider three
classes of addresses on a virtualized system:
• Virtual addresses, which are the same as the ones used by a conventional OS
• Guest physical address
• Machine memory
Guest operating systems maintain page tables that translate from virtual to pseudo-physical
addresses, and hypervisor maintains separate shadow page tables that translate from virtual
addresses to machine addresses [24].
The recent x86 CPUs support memory in hardware. Translation from virtual to physical
addresses is performed by the memory management unit (MMU) and the most used parts
of the page tables are cached in the translation lookaside buffer (TLB). Guest OS sees page
tables, which run on an emulated MMU. These tables provide the guest OS with the illusion
that it can translate the virtual guest OS addresses into real physical addresses, but it is the
hypervisor that deals with it. The real page table is the shadow page table used to translate
the virtual addresses of the guest OS into the real physical pages.
The classic implementation of hypervisors maintains a shadow page table, which allows to
control what page of the machine’s memory is available to a virtual machine. Just like in
a traditional operating system’s virtual memory subsystem, when the memory allocated to
VMs exceed the host physical memory size, the hypervisor can page the VM to the disk.
This way, the hypervisor can dynamically control how much memory each VM receives.
However, the hypervisor’s virtual memory system does not have the perception of which
pages are good for paging out but the guest OS should have because it can identify, for
instance, that the process that created a page has exited and so nothing will access to that
page. This page would not be a good candidate for paging out, but since the hypervisor’s
virtual memory system has no clue about that, it might page out that page.
To deal with this problem, VMware’s ESX Server created a mechanism which allows the
hypervisor to ask to the guest OS for the pages it can swap out, using a balloon process
[24]. A balloon process runs inside a guest OS and communicates with the hypervisor.
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Figure 2.3: ESX server memory mapping
When the hypervisor needs to take memory away from the VM, it communicates with the
balloon process to “inflate” the process, allocating more memory. This will force the guest
OS to select the pages to give to the balloon process, which will be passed to the hypervisor
for reallocation, but also it will force the guest OS to page memory to the virtual disk.
VMware engineers also develop a mechanism that would decrease the memory used by
several VMs running the same version of an operating system. They identify that different
virtual machines running the same operating system will produce redundant copies of code
and data stored in memory that could be shared among them. To address this, they have
designed a content-based page sharing system, analyzing if the contents of physical pages
are identical. When such content is identified, the hypervisor modifies the VM’s shadow
page table to point to only a single copy and freeing the redundant copy. If the content is
changed, then the hypervisor provides the VM with its own copy of the page, in a copy-
on-write page-sharing scheme [19]. However, this can have some drawbacks. In order
to detect duplicate pages, it is necessary to periodically scan the memory and build a list
of page fingerprints, which will be used to compare page contents. VMware ESX scans
frequency is set by default to once an hour (with the maximum of six times per hour [25]),
but this means that short-lived sharing opportunities will be missed [26].
Without shadow pages, it would be necessary to translate guest virtual memory into guest
physical memory and then translate this one into the real machine memory. The shadow
page table avoids the double bookkeeping by making the MMU work with the guest virtual
memory to real physical memory page table.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the VMware ESX server implementation of memory virtualization.
In this figure, the boxes represent the pages and the arrows show the different memory
mappings. As we can see, there are arrows from the guest virtual memory to the guest
physical memory which represents the mapping maintained by the page tables in the guest
OS. The arrows from guest physical to machine memory represent the mapping maintained
by the hypervisor, while the dashed arrows show the mapping from guest virtual memory
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to machine memory in the shadow page tables which is also maintained by the hypervisor.
Nevertheless, there is a performance issue because each update of the guest OS page tables
forces a shadow page table bookkeeping. The second generation of hardware virtualization
(Intel VT and AMD-V) partly solves this problem with their AMD’s Nested Page Tables
(NPT) and Intel’s Extended Page Tables (EPT).
When using nested paging, the CPU caches both guest virtual and physical memory as
the guest physical memory to real physical memory transition in the TLB. The TLB has a
new tag called Address Space Identifier (ASID) which allows to keep track of which TLB
entry belongs to which VM. This way, entries of different virtual machines can coexist in
the TLB at the same time. Using nested paging has an increment importance if there is
being used multiple virtual CPU per VM, because they have to sync the page tables many
times with direct impact on the shadow page table update. With NPT, the CPU only has to
synchronize TLBs as it would happen in a non-virtualized environment.
2.6 Device and I/O Virtualization
The VMM virtualizes the physical hardware and allows each virtual machine a set of cus-
tomizable virtual devices. Most of this virtualized I/O requires software drivers that run
on the host operating system to access the real hardware. If it is a type 2 hypervisor, then
it will use the device drivers already in the host OS, otherwise it may be necessary to de-
velop its own device drivers for the hardware on the machine, like in the case of VMware
ESX. Emulation is normally used for a VMM to handle I/O devices, and it is the VMM
the responsible to implement a software model of the I/O device, making believe the guest
OS that it is communicating to a hardware device, when is communicating with a software
model. The I/O virtualization may provide to the guest, virtual hardware that does not exist
in the real hardware, for instance, emulating an IDE hard disk when the real hardware is
SATA. The direct memory access (DMA) has problems when used with virtual machines.
The DMA controller can write to the entire physical memory instead of only the memory
assigned to the guest OS. In order to deal with this problem, Intel and AMD added I/O Me-
mory Management Unit (IOMMU). With IOMMU it is possible to restrict which physical
address a device may access.
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2.7 Types of Virtualization
When people talk about virtualization, normally they are talking about server virtualization.
However, information technology has other forms of virtualization commonly known and
used by other groups of people. For some, virtualization means storage virtualization, or
network virtualization or even application virtualization. Although my thesis will only
concern about server virtualization, I will do a brief explanation of each one.
2.7.1 Server Virtualization
There are many different implementations of server virtualization on, and for a big range of
CPU platforms and architectures. Informally, server virtualization can be seen as creating
many virtual systems within a single physical system. To accomplish this, we can take three
approaches: physical layer, virtualization layer and OS layer. Hardware partitioning divides
a single physical server into partitions where each partition is able to run an operating
system while hypervisor places a layer of software between the physical hardware and the
multiple operating systems that will share the same physical hardware.
Physical layer:
• Hardware partitioning: The server is physically segmented into distinct smaller sys-
tems that will act as a physically independent and self-contained server. Normally
each of these smaller systems has their own CPUs, OS, boot area, memory and net-
work resources. The implementation of this technique includes Static Hard Partitio-
ning, vPar, nPar among others [27].
Virtualization layer: Hypervisor technology can be organized in some distinct categories:
• Full virtualization: Allows virtual infrastructures to run unmodified operating sys-
tems in isolation. The operating system running inside the virtual machine is called
guest operating system. This approach was pioneered in 1967 with IBM CP-40 and
CP-67, predecessors of VM family. In order to implement full virtualization, it is
necessary a full combination of hardware and software, however not all architectures
have hardware to support virtualization. It was not possible on IBM System/370 until
1972 and it was not natively possible in the x86 architecture [28] until 2005 when
Intel and AMD added the hardware virtualization extensions (Intel VT and AMD-V
respectively). Nevertheless, many companies tried to accomplish full virtualization
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on x86 architecture even before Intel VT and AMD-V additions. VMware uses a
combination of direct execution with binary translation techniques [29] to accom-
plish full virtualization of an x86 system. This provides full disassociation of the
guest OS from the underlying hardware by the virtualization layer. As depicted in
Figure 2.4, the OS requests that needs to interact with the hardware are needs to be
translated by the VMM, replacing nonvirtualizable instructions with new sequences
of instructions, which have the same result on the virtual hardware , while the user’s
applications are directly executed on the processor for high performance virtualiza-
tion.
Figure 2.4: The binary translation approach to x86 virtualization used by VMware
• Paravirtualization: modifies the guest kernel system in order to purge the necessity of
binary translation. It has the advantage of higher performance but has the drawback
of needing a modified operating system kernel. The fact the virtual platform is not
identical to the real hardware, it makes necessary for the operating system to be
ported to the abstracted machine interface. This could be seen as a violation of the
Goldberg’s equivalence requirements, because the architecture-dependent part of the
operating system kernel needs to be changed [30]. The non virtualizable instructions
are replaced with hypercalls that communicate directly with the virtualization layer
hypervisor. The architecture independent part and the entire user mode software
stack stay unmodified.
• Emulation: Sometimes people confuse emulation with full virtualization. Although
both run unmodified guest operating systems, they are both very different. In emu-
lation, the virtual machine simulates the entire hardware set needed to run the un-
modified guest OS normally for a completely different hardware architecture. There
are some utilities for this technique. For instance, it allows to develop programs
and operating systems for new hardware design before the hardware is physical avai-
lable. It also allows, as we are going to see later, to run an unmodified version of
19
Microsoft Windows in Power PC architecture. Emulation does not satisfy Popek and
Goldberg’s efficiency requirement.
Operating System layer:
• Operating System-Level Virtualization: This is a technology that virtualizes servers
at the OS (kernel) layer. The physical server and instance of the OS is virtualized
into multiple isolated partitions. Each of them will look like a real server, from
the point of view of its owner. The OS kernel will run a single OS and provide its
functionality to each of the partitions. On Unix systems, this technology can be seen
as an advanced extension of the standard chroot mechanism. Operating system-level
virtualization has the disadvantage that strong isolation is difficult to implement. The
implementation of this technique include Solaris Container/Zone, FreeBSD Jails, Aix
Workload Partitions, Parallels Virtuozzo Containers, Linux VServers and OpenVZ.
2.7.2 Storage Virtualization
Storage virtualization has been around for a number of years. It has beginning with the
use of redundant array of independent disks (RAID). Using RAID it is possible to logically
group physical disks and present those groupings as a virtual disk to the OS. Using storage
virtualization it is possible to merge physical storage from many devices which will appear
as a single storage pool. This storage can be classified as direct attached storage (DAS),
network attached storage (NAS) and storage area network (SAN). They can be linked using
Fibre Channel, Fibre Channel and Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI),
Fibre Channel on Ethernet or Network File System (NFS). Storage virtualization it is not
a requirement for server virtualization but its use provides benefits since it can rely on the
assignation of a logical unit (LUN) of storage, but provisioning it only when needed. For
instance, if we have a LUN of 500 GB but we are only using 20GB, then only 20GB of
actual storage is provisioned. This reduces the cost of storage, since we only use what is
needed. Storage virtualization brings also help to the storage administrator, since it is easier
to manage tasks as backup, archiving or recovery.
2.7.3 Network Virtualization
When people talk about network virtualization, probably the first thing that comes to their
minds is Virtual Private Network (VPN) or perhaps Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN).
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However there is more when we talk about network virtualization. The most used network
virtualizations are:
• Virtual LAN (VLAN): Defined in the IEEE 802.1Q standard, is a method of creating
independent networks using a shared physical network. They are used to logically
segment broadcast domains and control the interaction between different network
segments. VLANS is a common feature in all modern Ethernet switches, allowing to
create multiple virtual networks, which isolates each segment from the others. All the
available resources are segments and allocated to each of these segments. Therefore,
VLAN is a safe method of creating independent or isolate logical networks within a
shared physical network.
• Virtual IP (VIP): A VIP is an IP address that is not associated to a specific computer
or network interface, but is normally assigned to a network device that is in-path
of the network traffic. Incoming packets are sent to the VIP but are redirected to
the actual network interface of the receiving host or hosts. It is used in solutions
like High-Available and Load-Balancing, where multiple systems have a common
application, and they are able to receiving the traffic as redirected by the network
device.
• Virtual Private Network (VPN): It is a private communication network that uses pu-
blic network, such as Internet. Its purpose is to guarantee confidentiality on an un-
secured network channel, from one site to another. It is normally used as a means
of extending remote employee home networks to the company network. This is nor-
mally done by using special software (as Cisco VPN Client), but after the connection
being established, all the interaction with the other resources on the network is hand-
led as if the computer was physically connected to the same network, although this
depends of the way security policies are applied.
2.7.4 Application Virtualization
Desktop applications have always been a headache for administrators. There were always
problems with missing or wrong versions of DLLs, or wrong registry keys or other pro-
grams (like antivirus software) that would interfere with their behavior. The web appli-
cations and dynamically updated applications have been very popular, because it can be
a workaround to most of desktop application problems. However, not everything can be
converted into a web application, and sometimes it is necessary to run application on the
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user side. Application virtualization tries to solve the desktop application problem by en-
capsulating a virtualization layer and all resources needed for the application to be run on a
user’s desktop. The virtualization layer is the one responsible to make the channel between
the application and the operating system, and so, it is possible to have many isolated ap-
plications running, and even different versions of the same application without interfering
between them[31]. Java Virtual Machine is an example of Application Virtualization.
2.8 Benefits of Virtualization
Nowadays, virtualization is in the vanguard, helping companies to take advantage of two
important properties of virtualization: scalability and management. It can bring many
benefits and there are many reasons for its application. We are going to see some of the
keys benefits of virtualization.
One of the benefits of virtualization has historical reasons and is related with the misused
of servers, mainly because of Microsoft Windows NT Server. This operating system started
to be used in datacenters back in 1990 although it was a hard battle in the beginning to be
accepted as a good operating system for enterprise datacenters. Today we know it was a
battle won and Microsoft has it share on most datacenters. However, Windows NT was
a monolithic OS and when an application freeze it would often freeze the OS causing
the well known Blue Screen of Death. Administrator started to apply the philosophy of
single-purpose servers, running a single application per server. This would prevent that if
one application fails, causing the operating system to fail, it would not disrupt any other
application running on another server. For these reason, each time it was necessary a new
business application, it was also necessary another server to be used. Over time, Microsoft
solved the monolithic problem but administrator’s habits were already created. However,
it is not only Microsoft’s fault. Many software vendors required their application to be
isolated so they can support them. In addition, security taught us that the less application
we have installed in a machine, the smaller will be the attack surface.
For this reason, companies have realized that most of their systems were running at ratios
of 10 percent or less of utilization, yet these systems continue to require space, power and
cooling system as any other machine. Instead of having some servers for their principal
services (e.g. email, stock programs), they can invest in a better server and consolidate all
those services in separated virtual machines. With that, they gain scalability, since they
can upgrade their virtual machine without necessary upgrade the physical machine. They
gain security, since they have a more control environment and easier to backup and restore,
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which also is related with management. However there is a drawback which has to be
balanced. Since all the main services of the company are installed on one only server (or
few), this is considered a single point of failure.
High availability is essential for corporate environment where availability of their services
is crucial to the success of their business. One of the advantages of using virtual machines
is that it can be restored very easily (one or very few files) and so, if updated backups
exists, then the IT manager can simply restore that file on another machine. Normally, it is
recommended hot standby virtual machines with at least two servers. Taking the example
of email server and stock programs, on the server A would be installed the email server
running on a VM (VM.A.1.ori) and an updated offline copy of the VM (VM.B.1.bck) with
the stock program running on the server B. And the opposite on server B, which would
be an update offline backup of the email server that is running on server A (VM.A.1.bck)
and the stock program running on a VM (VM.B.1.ori). If any problem happens to one of
the servers, there would be another server that could temporary support both VMs. This
example shows also another benefit of virtual machines, which is disaster recovery (DR).
Some companies have their disaster recovery center in another geographic location and
applying a hot standby allows them to easily replicate the VM to their DR center and when
needed, be able to quickly make the services available. Another advantage of virtualization
on disaster recovery is when facing an exploit that can compromise a server, be able to use
a VM trustworthy (i.e. not infected) baseline installation of the affected system, patch them
and turn into production, leaving the infected system for analysis and evaluation.
Virtual machines offer a perfect environment for development and research. According
to Silberschatz et al. [32], changing an operating system is a difficult task because they
are complex programs and since they executes in kernel mode, the impact of changing a
pointer can destroy the entire file system. Therefore, it is necessary to test all changes
to the operating system. With virtualization, the system programmer can have their own
virtual machine and system development or test is made on those virtual machines instead
of on a physical machine. This reduce the system development time and cost, increasing
the productivity.
Another benefit of virtualization is the possibility of having multiple operating systems
running, even those systems that are obsolete and cannot be utilized by the newer hardware
resources, may be supported to run on a virtual machine.
It is also useful for testing software solutions. Using virtualization, a company can try
some solutions without the necessity of using many real servers. The same way it is useful
for software developers to simulate the production environment the best they can using
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virtual machines, and that way, debugging their application in an almost real environment.
In addition to testing new solutions, virtual machines are useful to test new patches before
applying them into production systems.
Virtual Machines are also very useful for forensic team research. It is possible to clone a
potentially compromised host into a VM and do further investigation without the need of
the physical machine. The investigation team can also take advantage of snapshots to return
to a previous state. The same can be said for malware investigation team. It can be very
useful to use a VM since it guarantees isolation and to have the ability to use the snapshot
function. However, malware does not always have the same behavior inside a VM as on a
real machine.
There are other benefits of using virtualization. Honeypots or honeynets [33, 34] are intrin-
sically related with server virtualizations and are normally used by organizations to attract
possible attackers. Honeypots can be described as servers with fake information in an isola-
ted network, simulating a real DMZ or Intranet in order to analyze the attackers’ behavior.
The logs generated on these systems is much less than the generated every day on other
security systems as firewalls, IDS and IPS alerts or even system logs, but their value is
normally high, because it include most likely scans, probes and attacks [35]. Detect intru-
sions using hypervisor is purposed on some papers [36, 37, 38, 39, 40] as a way to alert for
rootkits running on the guest OS.
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Chapter 3
State of Art
According to a study from Gartner [41], in August of 2009 about 16 percent of workloads
are running in virtual machines, where VMware has 89% of the installation base followed
by Microsoft with 8%. Analysts expect that the installed base of virtual machines will grow
10 times in the next four years. However, the expectation is that VMware will lose some
of the market for Microsoft, Citrix and Red Hat. In the same study, Gartner expects that,
in 2012, VMware only has 65% of the installation base, while Microsoft would achieve 27
percent of market followed by Citrix with 6 percent.
In this chapter we present the most current used virtualization products, describing the main
components of each one and how they work.
3.1 VMware
Founded in 1998 by Diane Greene and Dr. Mendel Rosenblum along with two students
from Stanford University and a colleague from Berkley, VMware is a well known company
on the x86 virtualization market. In October of the same year, these five founders filed for
a patent regarding new virtualization techniques. These techniques were based on a project
called SimOS conducted at Stanford University. The U.S. Patent 6,397,242 was awarded
on May 28, 2002 [42].
Their first product was VMware Workstation with the first version being released on Fe-
bruary 8, 1999 for Windows and Linux. This is one of the most successful products from
VMware for desktop and stays as a commercial product with its current version 6.5.x. VM-
ware Workstation is a type 2 hypervisor, supported on top of a Host OS – either Windows
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or Linux – and able to create virtual machines for a variety of guests OS, such as Solaris
x86, Netware, FreeBSD, Windows and Linux.
In late 2000, they released their first version of the server virtualization platform called
VMware GSX Server. As in the case of VMware Workstation, this GSX Server needs to
be installed on top of an existing Windows or Linux operating system. In 2006, VMware
GSX Server was renamed to VMware Server and it is now released as freeware.
In 2001, VMware release their first version of Elastic Sky X (ESX) [43]. This is their first
server product with an approach different to that of the workstation version. In this case,
VMware ESX does not require a host OS, but instead it has its own native hypervisor on
a bare-metal system. This had the drawback to support less hardware but had the advan-
tage of requiring less overhead to host each virtual system. On May 2009, it was released
VMware ESX v.4.0. Figure 3.1 shows the many releases of VMware ESX Server. The in-
terval between the major releases and the minor release has been growing, from 14 months
between v.1.0 and v.1.5 to 26 months between 3.0 and 3.5. This is normally due the fact
minor releases are the accumulation of many patches released since the major release, but
also with added features.
Figure 3.1: VMware ESX server release history
3.1.1 The ESX Platform
The core of VMware ESX has three main modules capable of regulating CPU affinity,
memory allocation and oversubscription, network bandwidth throttling and I/O bandwidth
control. Along with these, Virtual Machine File System completes the VMware ESX base
platform. The three primary components of VMware ESX are:
Physical Host Server: This is related with the physical host server where VMware ESX
runs on. VMware had a Hardware Compatibility List (HCL) that includes some of
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the main servers’ brands on the market, such as Dell, Hewlett-Packard, IBM among
others. For support reasons, it is convenient to use ESX only on the servers reported
on HCL.
VMkernel: The VMkernel is the center of the VMware ESX hypervisor, and it is a high
performance operating system developed by VMware to run on the ESX host server.
Although it has some similarities, it is not a Linux kernel. It does not share the Linux
data structures or symbols neither depend on the Linux kernel for any services. The
VMware ESX has a modular approach, loading various system modules. However,
the version 3.x presents some innovations regarding this modular approach, such as
allowing new devices to be added without the need of recompile the VMkernel [44].
The Console Operating System (COS): The service console has been upgrade from being
based on a variant of Red Hat version 7.2 with ESX 2.x to Red Hat Enterprise Linux
3, Update 6 for ESX 3.0 [45] and Update 8 for ESX 3.5 [46]. The COS does not
interact with system hardware, that is a job made by VMKernel. The COS function
is to provide the executing environment for monitoring and administrating ESX. On
versions before ESX 3.0, VMkernel would only load after COS was fully booted. In
ESX 3.0 this was changed and now VMkernel runs before than COS. In fact, COS
runs within a specialized VM with more privilege than the normal VMs.
Some other important components of VMware ESX are:
Virtual Machine File System (VMFS): The VMFS is a high performance cluster file sys-
tem created by VMware. VMFS has many advantages compared to conventional file
system. One of those is the fact that up to 32 ESX Servers [47] can concurrently
read and write to the same storage by using per-file lock. It has some other important
security features such as the fact that it allows live migration of powered-on virtual
machines from a host server to another and by using distributed journaling, it is pos-
sible to recover VMs faster and more reliable in a case of a server failure. However,
according to Scott Davis [48] from VMware, the choice between VMFS and NFS
will depend of what type of storage infrastructure the organization is familiar with.
If it uses block based storage, then it is recommended to use VMFS, but if it is al-
ready using a Network-attached storage (NAS), then it would be recommended to
use NFS instead.
VirtualCenter: The VMware VirtualCenter is the management console used to control
the virtualized enterprise environments. Is provides services such as access control,
performance monitoring, and configuration.
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On December 28, 2004, VMware submitted VMware ESX Server 2.5.0 and VirtualCen-
ter 1.2.0 Target Of Evaluation (TOE) to Common Criteria for Evaluation Assurance Le-
vel (EAL) 2 conformance certification under the Operating Systems category. On March
27, 2006, Common Criteria confirmed the certification at EAL2. The evaluation was car-
ried out in accordance with the US Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) process. The criteria was judged as described in the Common Criteria for Infor-
mation Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2 and International Interpretations. The
TOE is Common Criteria 2.2 Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant.
On May 20, 2008, VMware VI3 (ESX Server 3.0.2 & VirtualCenter 2.0.2) achieved Com-
mon Criteria certification at EAL4+ under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and
Certification Scheme (CCS). EAL4+ is the highest assurance level that is recognized glo-
bally by all signatories under the Common Criteria Recognition Agreement (CCRA) and
achieved the lever at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line. VMware is the only company having an x86 virtualization product to suc-
cessfully complete the Common Criteria certification process. Currently, VMware ESXi
3.5 and VirtualCenter 2.5 and VMware Infrastructure 3.5 (VMware ESX Server 3.5 and
VirtualCenter 2.5) are in process of certification.
Although it was not possible to confirm, there are some informations on the Internet re-
porting that VMware ESX 2.0 and ESX 3.0 have 100,000 lines of code. During my thesis
research, I have questioned some of the key people in the virtualization world. One of
the person I have exchanged emails regarding VMware was Keith Adams, an ex Senior
Staff Engineer at VMware currently working on Facebook. I have questioned Keith Adams
about if he thinks this is an approximated number. In his own opinion, he believes the line
count for the VMkernel is higher, since it includes drivers for many storage and networking
devices. Nevertheless, he could not confirm me this number, because it was information he
did not have.
3.1.2 VMware ESXi
VMware ESXi was announced during VMworld 2007 and it is an integrated version of
VMware ESX but without the COS. This is important in terms of security. VMware ESXi
had RHEL-based COS replaced with BusyBox, which is a single binary that provides a
minimal set of services. Many of the security patches for VMware ESX where related
with security vulnerabilities on the Service Console (e.g. CVE-2009-1185, CVE-2009-
0034, CVE-2009-0846). It is tempting to say that removing this component from VMware
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ESXi will result in less security patches to be applied and so fewer downtimes for security
patching. Only when this product gets more mature and more used we can see if this is
correct or not.
Regarding my question if the core of VMware ESX and ESXi are similar, Keith answered
me by saying that “the VMkernel and VMM are almost byte-for-byte identical”.
3.2 Xen
The Xen project was first described in the paper “Xen and the Art of Virtualization” pre-
sented at SOSP in 2003 [49]. It was a project originally developed by the System Reseach
Group at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory and was part of the XenoSer-
vers projects [50] which had the goal of build a public infrastructure for global-scale service
deployment. The first public release of Xen 1.0 was made in October of 2003 and the pro-
ject had a good evolution all over the years, getting maturity in virtualizing resources like
CPU, memory, disk and network. For that, Xen had many project contributors, including
AMD, HP, Intel, Novell, RedHat and XenSource.
XenSource, Inc. was a company founded by Ian Pratt, senior lecturer at Cambridge and
lead of the Xen project, with the goal of supporting and developing the open source Xen
project and to create a commercial enterprise version of the software. In 2005, XenSource
release Xen 3.0, which was the first enterprise-class of Xen, supporting up to 32 processors.
It was also the first version with built-in support for Intel’s VT and with support for Physical
Address Extensions (PAE) to support 32-bit host servers with more than 4GB of memory.
At the time, ADM-V was not released yet, but eventually it was supported too. In order
to compete more directly with VMware, XenSource released XenOptimizer, an integrated
virtual infrastructure management platform competing with VMware’s VirtualCenter and
VMotion technologies.
However, XenSource was still missing the point, providing separated products when VM-
ware was taking the market with their consolidated product ESX. In order to change this,
XenSource released their first version of XenEnterprise 3.0, a product based on Xen v.3.0.3
and a directly compete with VMware ESX Server. This version had two important features:
It included a new management and monitoring console based on XenOptimizer and it was
the first Xen product supporting Windows guest operating systems. To this contributed the
partnership made between XenSource and Microsoft.
The year of 2007 was very interesting regarding Xen. In August 2007, XenSource announ-
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ced the release of XenEnterprise v4. This new version was more stable and added some
new features, which made it become closer in feature parity to VMware ESX, but at less
than half the cost. However, another important event happened in the world of Xen. At
the end of October 2007, Citrix completed its acquisition of XenSource [51] and the Xen
project moved to http://www.xen.org/.
Xen is an open-source hypervisor for both 32 and 64 bit process architecture that runs on
top of the bare-metal. It allows to securely and efficiently run several virtual guest OS on
the same host at the same time. Xen as many features as:
• Near native performance on the virtual machines
• Full support on x86 (32-bit) with and without Physical Address Extension (PAE)
• Full support on x86 with 64 bit extensions
• Support for almost all hardware with Linux drivers available
• Live migration of running virtual machines between two physical hosts with zero
downtime
• Support of Hardware Virtualization extensions from Intel (Intel-VT) and AMD (AMD-
V), allowing unmodified guest operating systems.
Initially, Xen would only support one mode of virtualization called paravirtualization (see
Section 2.7.1 on page 18). In this mode, the guest OS must be modified and the kernel
recompiled to support proper interaction with the Xen hypervisor. This had the drawback
of limiting the choice of OS, since it would have to be open source, but had the advantage
of improving its performance. Since version 3.0 of Xen, a new mode was introduced called
full virtualization (see 2.7.1 on page 18). This mode was only possible with the addition
of hardware virtualization extensions and so, the physical hosts must have an Intel-VT
or AMD-V processors. Unmodified guest OS as Microsoft Windows can now run in full
virtualization mode on Xen, with a minor performance penalty.
On the Xen technology, there are two important and distinct domains: Dom0 and DomU.
The Dom0 is a special privileged domain also designated as Domain0. It is the first domain
launched when the Xen’s system is booted. This domain can be used to create and configure
all the guest domains. These guest domains are called DomU because they are unprivileged
domain.
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The Dom0 has direct access to all hardware on the host machine and provides a simplified
generic class device to each DomU. For instance, the network card is viewed as a generic
network class device by the guest domain. Dom0 is the only one with a device driver which
is specific to each physical device and then communicates with the guest domain using an
asynchronous shared memory transport. However, Dom0 has the possibility to delegate the
responsibility for a particular device to another domain. This can bring some stability and
security advantages, since hardware drivers are the code in an operating system with most
likely to fail or have bugs. Using a driver domain, which is a DomU that runs a minimal
kernel and a backend for a particular device, it is possible to move the risk of the device
management out of the Dom0. Furthermore, if it is necessary to restart the driver domain
(e.g. from an error), this is not affect others domain, while if it was necessary to restart the
Dom0 this would affect all the system.
A driver domain or a physical device driver running in Dom0 is called a backend, while
the generic device accessed by each guest domain is called frontend driver. This technique
will allow creating the illusion that each frontend have a generic device dedicated to that
domain. The backend acts like a proxy, who understands the details of physical device and
enclose the generic device requests from each frontend and encapsulate them according
with the specification and send them to the corresponding hardware.
For security and stability reasons, Dom0 should be as small and simple as possible. It
is recommended to use Dom0 only for administration of virtual machines on the system
and restrict the user level code running on this domain. All other applications should run
in a guest domain. Similarly, it is recommend to harden the Dom0, closing services and
unnecessary network ports, making it less vulnerable to attacks or faulty software.
The Xen hypervisor and Dom0 acquires their privileged position in the boot process of the
system. The only software that will run before them is the boot loader. Currently the most
known boot loader for Linux and Solaris is GNU GRUB [52]. Xen hypervisor will be the
first software to “get in touch” with the hardware and so from the moment will control the
access to it from any other software. When selected on GRUB, Xen Hypervisor boots first
and then starts Domain0. If there is guest domains already created, Dom0 can start them
automatically, by consulting the configuration files normally located on etc/xen. ☎
# Modified by YaST2. Last modification on Mon Aug 24 13:47:26
WEST 2009
default 0
timeout 8
gfxmenu (hd0,1)/boot/message
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##YaST - activate
###Don’t change this comment - YaST2 identifier: Original name:
linux###
title openSUSE 11.1 - 2.6.27.29-0.1 (default)
root (hd0,1)
kernel /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.27.29-0.1-default root=/dev/disk/by-id/
ata-ST3160815AS_5RX0W316-part2 resume=/dev/disk/by-id/ata-
ST3160815AS_5RX0W316-part1 splash=silent showopts vga=0x31a
initrd /boot/initrd-2.6.27.29-0.1-default
###Don’t change this comment - YaST2 identifier: Original name:
xen###
title Xen -- openSUSE 11.1 - 2.6.27.29-0.1
root (hd0,1)
kernel /boot/xen.gz
module /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.27.29-0.1-xen root=/dev/disk/by-id/ata-
ST3160815AS_5RX0W316-part2 resume=/dev/disk/by-id/ata-
ST3160815AS_5RX0W316-part1 splash=silent showopts vga=0x31a
module /boot/initrd-2.6.27.29-0.1-xen
Listing 3.1: Excerpt from the GRUB configuration file on a OpenSUSE 11.1
The Linux version used for the Xen Hypervisor was OpenSUSE 11.1 and on this distri-
bution, the GRUB configuration file is located on /boot/grub/menu.lst (as Debian), while
on other systems like Fedora and Gentoo Linux, it is located under /boot/grub/grub.conf
or /etc/grub.conf. We can see that on Listing 3.1, in the case of Xen a different kernel is
loaded (/boot/xen.gz) and while on the first section for the “openSUSE 11.1 - 2.6.27.29-0.1
(default)”, the compressed bootable Linux kernel (vmlinuz) is executed on the kernel line.
In the case of the Xen section, the vmlinuz is loaded as a module pointing for the same
root and resume. The temporary file system used in the boot process of the Linux kernel
(designated as initial ramdisk, or initrd) is also loaded as a module.
In the past, choosing an operating system to run in a guest domain was limited to some
distributions, because it could use only the ones that were possible to port. Hardware
support for virtualization reduced the limitations on the selection of that operating system,
making possible to run closed source OS such as Microsoft Windows. In the case of the
operating system for the Domain0, there are no restrictions, as long as the operating system
supports Xen Hypervisor. In my case, I have selected OpenSUSE, but during my research,
I have tried Debian, Ubuntu and CentOS. From all of them, I have choose OpenSUSE only
because I was familiar with this distribution and because it was the only one providing the
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most recent version of Xen (v. 3.3.1) at the time.
Differences between Xen and VMware
As we have seen before, VMware’s architecture is based on direct execution and binary
translation. It can run user-level virtual machine code natively on the hardware and is
able to translate any privileged code. It is possible to run almost any operating system
that would run natively on a x86 inside a VM without modification. Xen’s architecture is
different because it uses a paravirtualization technique that modifies the guest OS so that
it knows that it is running inside a VM. Hardware assisted CPU virtualization techniques
(Intel VT and AMD-V) allowed Xen - since version 3.x - to support unmodified or fully
virtualized guest operating systems. Another important difference between them is the way
they handle device I/O and the way VM I/O route each physical I/O device. This is very
important because it has a direct impact on performance, portability and stability. Xen uses
a split driver approach where the actual drivers reside in a service VM and special drivers
that are inside other VMs will communicate back to that service VM. This has performance
advantages but will have impact on closed-source and legacy operating system. VMware
ESX has a different approach where the virtual devices drivers in VM communicate with
the physical device drivers using ESX kernel. This approach also provides high perfor-
mance but it has the advantage to support more operating systems, however it is necessary
to port new device drivers into the ESX kernel.
Management is another important component, even more on enterprise virtualization. VM-
ware provides management tools like VMware vCenter Server that allows deploying, mo-
nitoring, automating operations and managing of virtualized data centers. Novell and Red
Hat have been integrating the management of Xen platforms into their operating systems
with tools like YaST (Figure 3.2), Anaconda and management utilities like Virtual Machine
Manager.
3.3 KVM
KVM stands for Kernel-based Virtual Machine and is a full virtualization software for Li-
nux on x86 hardware, based on hardware virtualization extensions (Intel VT-X and AMD-
V) and an adopted version of QEMU, using the Linux Kernel as the Hypervisor [53]. KVM
does not run on CPUs without the hardware virtualization extensions. KVM consists of two
modules:
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Figure 3.2: OpenSUSE’s virtual machine manager running CentOS on DomU
• kvm.ko: A loadable kernel module that provides the core virtualization infrastructure
• kvm-[intel|amd].ko: A processor specific module for Intel or ADM
KVM takes advantage of code reuse. By using Linux Kernel 2.6.20 or later, it has the gua-
rantee of being updated to the current hardware and it takes advantage of its scheduling and
memory managing system. In addition, it uses also QEMU, to emulate the motherboard
hardware (e.g memory controller, network interface, ROM BIOS). As the hardware emula-
tion is based on QEMU, it is possible to move virtual machines between QEMU, KQEMU
and KVM hosts.
A traditional UNIX process has two modes of execution: user mode and system mode.
However KVM adds a new mode called guest mode. When guest software is running in
such a 3-state process, I/O instructions are executed in user mode with the privileges of the
user who owns that guest host process. All the non-I/O code runs in guest mode and the
system mode is only used for special instructions or for transitions among modes [54].
The kernel module exports a character device (/dev/kvm) which adds the virtualization
capabilities to user-space. With this device, a VM has its own address space with its own
virtual disk, network adapter and display separated from any other VM that is running.
Devices in the device tree (/dev) are normally common to all user-space processes, however
this is different for /dev/kvm since each process that opens it sees a different map. This
guarantees VM isolation [55].
Each VM is a single process of the host operating system (or hypervisor) and so all the
standard Linux process management tools can be used. For instance, it is possible to pause,
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resume or even kill a VM with the kill command or view the resource usage by it with
the command top. Permissions are handled the same way as a file in Linux, meaning that
the VM belongs to the user who started it and that has access to /dev/kvm, which does
not necessary mean it needs root access. All the accesses are verified by the kernel, in the
same way as any access to files by the user. This has the advantage that any Linux has the
necessary standard tools to be used by any system administrator. KVM currently supports
Linux VMs (x86 and x86_64) , Windows VMs (x86 and x86_64), BSD VMs (x86 and
x86_64), among others. A complete description of the supported systems can be found on
the “Guest Support Status” of the KVM site [56].
QEMU is platform virtualization solution that emulates an entire computer environment.
Any I/O request from a guest OS are intercepted and emulated by the QEMU process.
KVM provides memory virtualization through the /dev/kvm device. The physical memory
that is mapped for the guest OS is in fact virtual memory mapped into the process. This is
achieved by using shadow page tables [55].
3.4 QEMU
The terms virtualization and emulation are occasionally used to describe virtualization pro-
ducts. Sometimes people say, by the fact that they are running something that was supposed
to run in another platform, then that is considered virtualization. For instance, it is possible
to run ancient arcade games in a normal computer, using images of their ROMs. In this
case, what we are running is an emulator program and not a virtualization program. Virtua-
lization techniques normally run software that was compiled for the native instruction set of
the physical hardware on where the virtual machine is running, while emulation techniques
normally emulates all the physical environment, including processor. Microsoft Virtual PC
and QEMU are two examples of emulation product.
QEMU stands for Quick Emulator and it is an open source emulator, which uses dynamic
recompilation with the purpose to reduce the overburden caused by the emulation. It was
developed by Fabrice Bellard and it can emulate a multiplicity of architectures, processors
and related peripheral hardware [57]. It can run OS and software that was compiled for
platforms such as 32 - and 64 - bit x86, 32 - and 64 - bit PowerPC, Motorola 68000, 32 - and
64 - bit SPARC, SH, MIPS, and ARM. It can virtualize a complete hardware environment
for each of these processors and architectures, enabling the possibility to run unmodified
guest OS for any of those. It is used as the base of various virtualization products, like
KVM, Virtualbox ,KQEMU and even Xen.
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According to Bartholomew [58], QEMU provides emulated versions of the following x86
hardware:
• i440FX host PCI bridge and PIIX3 PCI to ISA bridge.
• Cirrus CLGD 5446 PCI VGA card or dummy VGA card with Bochs VESA exten-
sions (hardware level, including all nonstandard modes).
• PS/2 mouse and keyboard.
• Two PCI IDE interfaces with hard disk and CD-ROM support.
• Floppy disk.
• NE2000 PCI network adapters.
• Serial ports.
• SoundBlaster 16 card.
• PC BIOS from the Bochs Project.
• Plex86/Bochs LGPL VGA BIOS.
QEMU has two emulation modes: User mode emulation and complete computer system
mode emulation. On user mode emulation, QEMU can run Linux or Mac OS X processes
compiled for one architecture on another. An example of this mode is when a user runs a
Windows API on Linux using Wine. On the complete computer system mode emulation, or
just system emulation, is where QEMU can emulate a complete computer system, allowing
running unmodified OS and user processes for a specific architecture and processor.
3.4.1 KQEMU
KQEMU was also written by Fabrice Bellard and is a Linux Kernel module to accelerate
QEMU on x86 platforms. . It is a type 2 hypervisor, using dynamic recompilation. User
mode code is run directly on the host’s CPU while the kernel mode code uses processor and
peripheral emulation. There is also the possibility of kernel emulation where a portion of
the kernel mode code runs on the host’s CPU. One of the advantages of KQEMU compared
with KVM (which is another Linux kernel module) is that KQEMU does not need that the
host CPU to support hardware virtualization.
It can run on X86 and the only operating system full supported is Linux. However, there
are some experimental versions for FreeBSD and Windows XP
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3.5 Microsoft Virtual PC
Around the same time VMware released their VMware ESX Server, Connectix was having
a good partnership with Microsoft, because they provided a bundle of Microsoft’s operating
systems with the Connectix Virtual PC for Mac. In the beginning of 2003, Connectix gives
the first public stop for the x86 server virtualization, releasing their first release candidate
of their Connectix Virtual Server. The final release of this product never saw the daylight
as Connectix because Microsoft acquired the intellectual property rights of both Connectix
Virtual PC for Windows as Mac and as well as Connectix Virtual Server.
The released of Microsoft’s first virtualization product was back in December 2, 2003 with
Microsoft Virtual PC 2004. On the next year, Microsoft planned to release their Microsoft
Virtual Server 2004, entering into the x86 server virtualization market, but the released was
delayed due to the new Microsoft security initiative. Because of that, the final product was
released in the middle of 2004 in two versions - Microsoft Virtual Server 2005 Standard
Edition (limited to four physical processors) and Microsoft Virtual Server 2005 Enterprise
Edition (supporting up to 32 physical processors).
Microsoft Virtual PC emulates x86 platform and was very popular when Apple Macintosh
systems used PowerPC chips, because it was possible to install Microsoft Windows on their
PPC systems. Currently, Apple Macintosh use Intel chips and Parallels Workstation and
VMware Fusion conquered Apple users for their virtualization products.
Currently, Microsoft Virtual PC is already considered a virtualization product for Microsoft
Windows operating systems but continues to be an emulation product for Mac OS X and
has been deprecated for this one. It is free to download and use, but officially supports only
Microsoft Windows operating systems.
3.6 Microsoft Hyper-V
The fact that VMware ESX Server and Xen are having more and more a deeper penetra-
tion on the server virtualization market made Microsoft to develop their own hypervisor
technology, originally called Viridian and later renamed to Hyper-V.
Hyper-V is a type 1 hypervisor because it runs directly on the hardware of the host sys-
tem and is responsible for sharing the physical hardware resources with multiple virtual
machines. It is part of the Windows Server 2008 and it is a native 64-bit hypervisor that
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can run 32-bit and 64-bit VMs concurrently. The main goal of Hyper-V on Windows Ser-
ver 2008 is to enable the possibility to run multiple guest operating systems (also called
partitions) on a single server hardware system.
Figure 3.3: Overview of hypervisor architecture
As we can see on Figure 3.3, Microsoft hypervisor runs on top of bare metal, which makes
this architecture a type 1 hypervisor. On top of the hypervisor, there is one parent partition
and one or more child partitions. The concept of partitions is the same as the domains in
Xen. It is a unit of isolation within the hypervisor with allocated physical memory address
space and virtual processors. There are two types of partitions:
• Parent Partition: Is the controlling partition where the virtualization stack runs and is
the one responsible for the management of other child partitions. Is also the one that
manages and assign the hardware devices with the exception of processor scheduling
and physical memory allocation since these are handled by the hypervisor.
• Child Partition: This is where the guest operating systems (and their applications)
will run and they are created by the parent partition.
Partitions communicate with the hypervisor layer by using “hypercalls”. These hypercalls
can be considered application programming interfaces (APIs) used by partitioned operating
systems in order to take advantage of the optimization provided by the hypervisor.
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We are going to see a brief description of each component of the virtualization stack on the
parent partition:
• Virtual Machine Management Service: The VMM Service is responsible for mana-
ging the state of all virtual machines in child partitions. It is also responsible for
controlling what operation can be performed on a virtual machine in a given state.
• WMI Provider: provides an interface for remote administration
• Virtual Machine worker processes: User mode process, which provides VMM Ser-
vice from the Windows Server 2008 instance in the parent partition to the guest ope-
rating systems in the child partitions. For security reasons, each VMMS spawns a
separate VMworker process for each running VM. This allows isolations in the sense
that if one VM worker process fails, only the VM associated with it is affected.
• Virtualization Infrastructure Driver: Is the kernel-mode component of the virtuali-
zation stack and provides three principal management services (MS) for all child
partition: Virtual processor MS, Memory MS and partition MS.
Beside Virtualization Stack, some other components are important for the Parent partition:
• Windows Hypervisor Interface Library (WinHv): is the kernel-mode dynamic-link
library that loads inside the Windows Server 2008 instance running in the parent
partition and inside the guest OS in any child partition although the guest has to be
Hyper-V-aware.
• Virtual Service Providers: VSPs provides a way of publishing device services to
child partitions. In order to do it, it provides I/O related resources to Virtualization
Service Clients (VSC) running in the child partitions.
• Virtual Machine Bus (VMBus): This is a logical inter-partition communication me-
chanism between the parent partition and the child partitions. It is channel-based and
its purpose is to provide high-speed communications mechanism between virtualized
partitions. For instance, VSCs and VSPs use client/server communication for device
functionality using VMBus.
Hyper-V-aware Operating Systems include Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2003
SP2, Novell SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 10, Windows Vista SP1, andWindows XP SP3.
Non-Hyper-V-aware Operating Systems include Windows Server 2000 and older versions
of Windows.
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As we have seen on Figure 3.3, there are three types of child partitions:
• Child partitions hosting Hyper-V-aware Windows operating systems
• Child partitions hosting Hyper-V-aware non-Windows operating systems
• Child partitions hosting non-Hyper-V-aware operating systems, either Windows or
other types
Beside WinHv and WMBus, child partitions hosting Hyper-V-aware Windows operating
systems include two important kernel-mode virtualization components, which are virtua-
lization service clients (VSC) and Enlightenments. VSC are devices residing in the child
partition that use hardware resources provided by the VSP, which are in the parent partition.
The communication between them is made over VMBus. VSCs are available automatically
if the operating system installed on the child partition has integration services (IS) instal-
led. Professional versions of Windows 7 (Business, Enterprise and Ultimate) as well as all
versions of Windows Server 2008 R2 already come with integration components installed,
but it is necessary to install as an extra for other operating system, like Windows Vista. Wi-
thout IS installed, a child partition can only use emulated devices which is the case for the
Child partitions hosting non-Hyper-V-aware operating systems. Enlightenments refer to
the modification made to operating systems so these can run more efficiently as a guest wi-
thin a hypervisor environment. Child Partitions Hosting a Hyper-V-Aware Non-Windows
Operating System use third party VSCs to communicate over the VMBus, however it is
necessary to have the Integration Services installed in the child partition.
Integration Services are key components that provide Heartbeat, Time Synchronization
and Volume Shadow Copy Service among others. Hyper-V includes Integration Services
for both x86 and x64 versions of the following Windows operating systems:
• Windows XP with Service Pack 3 (SP3)
• Windows Vista with Service Pack 1 (SP1)
• Windows 7
• Windows Server 2003 SP2
• Windows Server 2008
• Novell SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 10
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• Novell SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11
The version of Integration Services developed by Microsoft for the Novel SUSE Linux
Enterprise Server is called Linux Integration Components for Hyper-V.
The third type of Child Partitions is related with those that cannot have Integrated Services
installed on them. This can be because it is an older version of Windows (Windows Server
2000 or previous) or a third-party operating system not supported (like Red Hat Enter-
prise Linux 5.2). In this case, the operating system must use emulated devices, which has
performance impact.
3.7 VirtualBox
VirtualBox is type 2 virtualization software package for x86 infrastructures originally de-
veloped by a German company called Innotek. On February 20, 2008 Sun completed the
acquisition of Innotek [59] and since then, VirtualBox makes part of its Sun xVM virtuali-
zation platform.
VirtualBox uses software virtualization to run VMs, however, when running on Intel-VT
and AMD-V capable CPUs, it provides the option to enable hardware virtualization on a
per virtual machine basis. Prior to version 2.2, software was the option by default. On all
the versions prior to that until the current version (3.0.10), the default option for hardware
virtualization is enabled for the new virtual machines. The reason pointed by VirtualBox
for this change is the fact that running a VM using the latest Intel and AMD processors with
this option enabled is faster than using software virtualization in most of the situations.
VirtualBox, in its current version (3.0.10) supports the following guest operating systems:
• All family of Windows versions (fromWindows 3.1 to Windows 7 – x86 and 64-bit).
• Linux (kernel 2.2, 2.4 and 2.6 – x86 and 64-bit)
• OS/2 Warp (OS/2 Warp 3, OS/2 Warp 4, OS/2 Warp 4.5, eComStation)
• Solaris and OpenSolaris – x86 and 64-bit
• BSD (FreeBSD, OpenBSD and NetBSD – x86 and 64-bit)
• DOS, Netware, L4 and QNX
For the host operating system, VirtualBox can be installed on Windows x86/AMD64, Mac
OS X, Linux, Solaris and OpenSolaris x86/AMD64
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3.8 Virtualization Solutions Comparison Matrix
The virtualization solutions described are, in our opinion, the most important products
currently used. On Table 3.1, we present a comparison of various hardware and operating
system-level virtualization solutions products that includes the previous one presented and
the ones we did not described but we consider important. The column “Host OS” means
different things depending of the type of the hypervisor:
• For the case of type 1 hypervisors, this column is related to the operating system
supported for the special privileged area such instance by the dom0 (Xen) or parent
partition (Hyper-V).
• For the case of type 2 hypervisors, this column is related to the operating system on
where the hypervisor is installed.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter described some different type 1 and type 2 server virtualization products that
we consider to be the most used on x86 architecture. There are many solutions that a person
could chose, some open source, others proprietary. VMware is the most used virtualization
product, with an installed base of 89 percent. Therefore, we can say that VMware is for
server virtualization what Microsoft is for desktop operating systems or what Cisco is for
network.
42
N
am
e
V
irt
ua
liz
at
io
n
Li
ce
ns
e
A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
es
G
ue
st
C
PU
H
os
tO
S
G
ue
st
O
S
Ty
pe
X
en
[F
][
P]
G
PL
x8
6,
x8
6-
64
,I
A
64
,P
PC
x8
6
Li
nu
x,
So
la
ris
,N
et
B
SD
B
SD
,L
in
ux
,S
ol
ar
is
,
W
in
do
w
s
1
K
V
M
[F
][
P]
G
PL
x8
6,
x8
6-
64
,I
A
64
,P
PC
,
S3
90
x8
6
Li
nu
x
Li
nu
x,
W
in
do
w
s
1-
2
U
M
L
[P
]
G
PL
x8
6,
x8
6-
64
,P
PC
x8
6
Li
nu
x
Li
nu
x
2
L4
Li
nu
x
[P
]
G
PL
x8
6,
A
R
M
,M
IP
S
x8
6
L4
Li
nu
x
1
Q
EM
U
[F
]
G
PL
,L
G
PL
x8
6,
x8
6-
64
,I
A
64
,P
PC
,
A
R
M
,M
IP
S,
SP
A
R
C
(k
Q
EM
U
on
ly
x8
6/
x8
6-
64
)
x8
6,
SP
A
R
C
,P
ow
er
PC
,
M
IP
S
B
eO
S,
B
SD
,L
in
ux
,M
ac
O
X
,S
ol
ar
is
B
SD
,L
in
ux
,W
in
do
w
s
2
O
pe
nV
Z
[O
]
G
PL
x8
6,
x8
6-
64
,I
A
64
,P
PC
,
SP
A
R
C
,A
R
M
Sa
m
e
as
H
os
t
Li
nu
x
Li
nu
x
2
V
irt
ua
lB
ox
[F
]
G
PL
/
R
et
ai
l
x8
6,
x8
6-
64
x8
6
W
in
do
w
s
x8
6/
x8
6-
64
,O
S
X
,L
in
ux
,S
ol
ar
is
an
d
O
pe
nS
ol
ar
is
B
SD
,L
in
ux
,S
ol
ar
is
,
W
in
do
w
s
2
V
M
w
ar
e
Se
rv
er
/
W
or
ks
ta
tio
n
[F
]
Se
rv
er
:F
re
e
R
et
ai
l
W
or
ks
ta
tio
n:
R
et
ai
l
x8
6,
x8
6-
64
x8
6
W
in
do
w
s,
Li
nu
x
W
in
do
w
s,
Li
nu
x,
N
ov
el
l
N
et
w
ar
e,
Su
n
So
la
ris
,
M
S-
D
O
S,
Fr
ee
B
SD
2
V
M
w
ar
e
ES
X
(i)
[F
]
R
et
ai
l
x8
6,
x8
6-
64
x8
6
N
on
e
-b
ar
e-
m
et
al
W
in
do
w
s,
Li
nu
x,
N
ov
el
l
N
et
w
ar
e,
Su
n
So
la
ris
,
Fr
ee
B
SD
1
M
ic
ro
so
ft
V
irt
ua
l
PC
[F
]
R
et
ai
l
x8
6
x8
6
M
ic
ro
so
ft
W
in
do
w
s
IB
M
O
S/
2,
M
ic
ro
so
ft
W
in
do
w
s
2
M
ic
ro
so
ft
H
yp
er
-V
[F
]
R
et
ai
l
x8
6
x8
6
W
in
do
w
s
20
08
w
/H
yp
er
-V
R
ol
e,
W
in
do
w
s
H
yp
er
-V
Se
rv
er
W
in
do
w
s,
SU
SE
1
z/
V
M
[F
][
P]
R
et
ai
l
s3
90
s3
90
z/
V
M
ru
ns
di
re
ct
ly
in
si
de
LP
A
R
Li
nu
x
fo
rS
ys
te
m
z,
z/
O
S,
z/
TP
F,
z/
V
SE
,z
/V
M
1
Pa
ra
lle
ls
W
or
ks
ta
tio
n
[F
]
R
et
ai
l
x8
6
x8
6
W
in
do
w
s,
Li
nu
x
W
in
do
w
s,
Li
nu
x,
Fr
ee
B
SD
,O
S/
2,
eC
om
St
at
io
n,
M
S-
D
O
S,
So
la
ris
2
Le
ge
nd
:[
F]
-F
ul
lV
irt
ua
liz
at
io
n,
[P
]-
Pa
ra
vi
rtu
al
iz
at
io
n,
[O
]-
O
S
V
irt
ua
liz
at
io
n,
SM
P
-S
ym
m
et
ric
M
ul
tiP
ro
ce
ss
or
Ta
bl
e
3.
1:
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
of
th
e
fe
at
ur
es
an
d
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
of
th
e
va
ri
ou
s
vi
rt
ua
liz
at
io
n
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
av
ai
la
bl
e
43
44
Chapter 4
Security of Virtual Machines
4.1 Some Important Concepts
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Virtual Machine technology is going mainstream,
implemented on every branch of the industry (e.g. Telecom, Finance), running critical
services, which were previously implemented in isolated servers.
There are many reasons for its implementation: cost savings, server consolidation, disaster
recovery and improved business continuity, among others. For instance, in order to have a
database server, an email server and a webserver, running on different operating systems,
it was necessary to have three servers, each running on a different operating system and
service. Nowadays, with virtualization, it is possible to reduce the number of servers, being
necessary, for instance, only one server running a hypervisor and three virtual machines.
However, industry pundits agree that a very important component has been neglegted: se-
curity. According to Gartner [60], "through 2009, 60 percent of production VMs will be
less secure than their physical counterparts" and that "30 percent of deployments [will be
associated] with a VM-related security incident". This can even be worst if we consider that
85 percent of VMware’s customers are using virtualization for mission-critical production
services.
Let us take as example the previous simple case. In the scenario with the three isolated
servers, we had a traditional threat model (Figure 4.1a on page 46) where to compromise
the host, the attacker would typically explore a vulnerability in an application and with that
attack the operating system or she could explore some vulnerability on the operating system
and then get access to the application. With virtualization, a new scenario is presented,
with all the servers consolidated on a single server running three virtual machines. In
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this case, a new threat model (Figure 4.1b on page 46) allows not only the same attacks
as the traditional model but also opens the possibility to do new attacks and explore new
vulnerabilities. Since each VM can be “exactly the same” as the real one (in the sense that
it can have, for instance, the same number of CPUs, amount of memory, patches installed
and configuration), an attacker can explore a vulnerability in an application the same way
as it was done on the traditional threat model (arrows #1). Besides that, she has new targets
to check for vulnerabilities. If the virtualization layer have vulnerabilities, she could launch
an attack from a guest OS against the others VMs in the same host (arrows #2), or could
attack the host by doing a denial of service exploring the host vulnerability in a virtual
device . Doing this attack, she could attack the other guests in the same host (arrows #3).
The impact of compromise the virtualization layer raises the risk’s level, since it is a critical
asset shared by all the virtual machines. However, the attack can be remote too (arrow #4).
For instance, recently it was discovered a vulnerability in some VMware products which
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable hypervisors.
(a) Traditional threat model (b) New threat model
Figure 4.1: The traditional vs new threat model
Another important aspect related to security failures in virtualization regards misconfigu-
ration resulting from human error. According to Gartner [60], "the security issues related
to vulnerability and configuration management get worse, not better, when virtualized”.
One of the reasons for this concern is the fact that replicating an insecure VM image is
easier than before. VMs provide mobility similar to a normal file. For instance, they can be
copied to other computers over a network or it can be carried on a portable storage media.
Therefore, they can be deployed in many systems, some not managed by the local admi-
nistrator, and so, it requires a bigger effort to discover those insecure images and correct
them.
Many organizations still have the same approach in order to secure their VMs as if they
were securing an operating system, using the same configuration guidelines and standards.
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This is a ”normal” mistake, even more because there is a lack regarging virtualization on
pilar documents as the information security standard ISO/IEC 17799:2005 and ISO/IEC
27002:2005.
4.1.1 Isolation
As we have seen in Chapter 2.3, one of the key issues in virtualization is isolation. This
isolation will guarantee that one application in one VM cannot see applications running
in a different VM, or that some process running in one VM can not affect the other VMs
running in the same machine. If this security assumption is broken, then an attacker can
have access to other VMs in the same machine or even to the host machine. That is why it
must be carefully configured and maintained.
A workaround to isolation, possible to use in some software like VMware Workstation or
Sun Virtualbox, is to share the clipboard. This way, it is possible to exchange data between
the host and the guest machine. However, this workaround can open breaks to the security.
According to Kirch [61], sharing the clipboard can “provide a gateway for transferring data
between cooperating malicious programs in VMs of different security realms or to exfiltrate
data to/from the host operating system.”
In the same whitepaper, the author refers some others isolation security breaks like the fact
that in one VM technology (without mention which one), “the operating system kernel that
provides the VM layer has the ability to log keystrokes and screen updates passed across
virtual terminals in the virtual machine”. These logs (keystrokes and screen updates) are sa-
ved into files on the host machine, which allows external treatment (analyzing, monitoring,
eavesdropping) of terminal connections inside the VM, even the encrypted one.
In order to guarantee isolation, a program running inside a VM A should only interact with
another program in VM B on the same host the same way that a program installed on a
physical machine A would interact with another program on other physical machine B. If a
program on VM A is able to change memory or monitoring VM B, then this is considered
a serious isolation break.
4.1.2 Controlling VMs from the Host
Hosts have the authority to control VMs and therefore can interact with them in many ways,
depending of the VM technology used [61]:
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• It can start, pause, stop (shutdown) and restart VMs
• It can change and monitor different VMs resources as CPU, memory, disk, among
others.
• It can interact with the VM´s virtual disks, with operations like view, copy and po-
tentially modify data stored.
Beside the previous properties, normally the host can also monitor the network traffic from
or to VMs. Because of all these control that hosts machines have over the VMs, it is an
important target of attack and so, needs to have a special attention.
4.2 Analyze of Security Vulnerabilities in Virtualization
4.2.1 Attacks from the Guest to the Host
There can be some external or internal factors that can compromise isolation as miss-
implementation/configuration or some bug in the virtualization software. A dangerous
attack can be made if isolation between the host and the VMs is compromised. That attack
is called ”VM escape” and happens when a program can bypass the virtual machine layer
from inside a VM and get access to the host machine. The host machine is the root of
all the VMs, and so if a program escapes from the virtual machines privileges it will get
root, allowing to control all the VMs and the traffic between them. This kind of attack are
normally possible by exploiting bugs on the VMM combined with improperly configura-
tion of the host/guest interaction. However, current VMMs do not offer perfect isolation,
although they claim to. Many bugs have been found in all popular VMMs, some of them
allowing ”VM escape”, like the VMware Workstation 6 CVE-2007-4496 [62] bug disco-
vered by Rafal Wojtczuk which allows authenticated users with administrative privileges
on a guest operating system to corrupt memory and possibly execute arbitrary code on the
host operating system via unspecified vectors.
What happens if isolation failed and a VM can monitor another VM? As we have seen
before, isolation plays a crucial role in virtualization. Therefore, it is considered a security
flaw if isolation is overcome, and a VM can monitor another without any difficult and
specific configuration. Moreover, this is not a probable thing to happen neither easy to
achieve. Most of the modern CPUs have mechanisms of memory protection, which can be
enforced by the hypervisor, and they are responsible for memory isolation. This way, if
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well implemented (and again, the idea of many of the security flaws happens because they
are not well implemented), memory protection should avoid VMs to see memory used by
others VMs.
Even if they do not share memory (forced by the memory protection), there is something
“shared” by them and this can be another point of attack, depending how it was implemen-
ted. There is no network protection implemented by hardware as there is with memory
and so, this is something that requires special care. The more secure way would be by
using a dedicated physical channel for each host-VM link. This way, each guest VM could
not sniff what the others are sending or receiving. However, sometimes we can find VM
platform linked to the host using “virtual hub” or “virtual switch”. If a "virtual hub" is
being used, the VM guests are able to sniff the packets in the network, while in the case of
using "virtual switch", VM guests can do a Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing
[63], redirecting the packets to them, and in this way, be able to sniff packets going to and
coming from other guest VM.
According to the author [61], in case of necessity of using “virtual hub” or “virtual switch”,
two mechanisms could be implemented. It could be used authentication of network traffic
and also, in order to avoid ARP poisoning, “enforce limits on what Ethernet MAC address
is used on a VM’s virtual network interface”, although there are some doubts among the
community regarding if is possible to avoid this attack if VMs are on the same VLAN/Port
group [64]. Port groups define how VM connections are made through the virtual switch.
Using port groups it is possible to configure bandwidth limitations and VLANs tagging
policies for each member port. It is also possible to aggregate multiple ports in order to
provide a local point for virtual machines to connect to a network.
Recently, a bug was found in VMware’s virtualization software [65] which would allow a
guest to write to arbitrary memory. Althought a patch was already released, bugs like this
are very serious and can put in risk a VM architecture.
4.2.2 Remote Management Vulnerabilities
It is common in the current VM Environments to have a management consoles that ma-
nages the virtual machines. Normally, commercial products have their own. For instance,
VMware uses VMware vSphere to manage the Hypervisor, while Citrix XenServer can
use XenCenter. These consoles bring new facilities for administrators to manage their ma-
chines, but also open new vulnerabilities. Compromising a management console allows
an attacker to control all the virtual machines managed by it. These type of technology
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normally communicates with the VMM using HTTP/HTTPS which mean the VMM has
to have a service running accepting HTTP connection. Xen, for instance, has the XenAPI
HTTP Interface that had a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability, which allowed running
a script code in a user’s browser session in context of an affected site.
HyperVM [66] is a multi-tiered, multi-server, multi-virtualization software which allows
to create and manage different Virtual Machines (Xen or OpenVZ) each with each Virtual
Private Server (VPS) having its own operating system. In June 8 of 2009, 100,000 hosted
websites were affected by a zero-day SQL injection hole [67] in the HyperVM 2.09 . With
this attack, it was possible to gain root privileges allowing the attacks to run sensitive
Unix commands as "rm -rf", which forces a recursive delete of all files in the current and
sub directories. As a result, many clients were affected and some lost their data forever,
because they did not have any backup.
4.2.3 Denial of Service
A Denial of Service (DoS) has the goal to make a computer resource not available to its
intended users. In virtual machine architecture, resources as CPU, memory, disk and net-
work are shared between the host and the guests. It is then possible for a guest machine to
impose a denial of service (intentional or not) to others guest which would also affect the
host by taking all the possible resources of the system. When other guests try to request a
resource, the system will deny that access since there is no resource available. VMware has
been shown to suffer from several DoS vulnerabilities(4.2). A good approach to prevent
this attack from a guest is to limit the resources VMs can access. Most of the current vir-
tualization technologies have the mechanisms necessary to limit the resources allocated to
each guest machine. With the correct configuration of the host virtualization, this attack
can be minimized.
4.2.4 Virtual-Machine-Based Rootkit (VMBR)
The concept of Rootkits appeared in the Unix world. They were developed to replace stan-
dard Unix tools with versions that gave a user root or super-user privileges, while allowing
their activity to remain invisible to other users. Rootkits had the particular ability to hide
itself, being very difficult for users or processes to discover their existence. This amazing
ability soon would raise eyebrows on hackers, because it would be an ideal way to cover
their devious activities. A rootkit is normally designated as a program designed to hide not
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only itself, but also other programs and all its associated resources (e.g. processes, files,
ports).
A rootkit tries to escalate privileges, with the goal of running in ring 0 which is the operating
system’s kernel mode. If it succeeded, can easily terminate applications run in ring 3 (user
mode), by any normal user, including root. Virtualization adds a higher privilege ring
(ring -1) and if a rootkit could compromise that ring, it gain control of the whole physical
environment on which the system runs. Rootkits hiding in this layer are considered VMBR
and they are even harder to discover and be removed than then ones on kernel mode. Two
example of this type of rootkits are BluePill and SubVirt. A third one was also released
called Vitriol, created by Dino Dai Zovi using Intel VT. I am now describing the first two.
4.2.4.1 Blue Pill
Blue Pill is a VMBR rootkit created by Joanna Rutkowska for COSEINC in 2006 to exploit
the AMD64 Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) Extensions - also known as Pacifica - on AMD
Athlon 64. The main idea was that it should install itself without necessary any intervention
of the machine, and would move the operating system into the virtual machine. This rootkit
was itself a hypervisor that would allow to control the guest OS and cannot be detected
using any integrity scanner. Joanna Rutkowska and Alexander Tereshkin released a new
version of BluePill in 2007. It was redesigned because the original version is property of
COSEINC. This new version was able to work on the AMD SVM and Intel VT.
Blue Pill uses the concept of “thin hypervisor” to control the operating system. This thin
hypervisor is based on hardware virtualization provided by the SVM [23] and VT [68].
SVM makes part of the AMD-Virtualization (also called AMD-V) and it is an extension of
the AMD 64 architecture, which provides hardware support to improve performance and
facilitate implementation of virtualization introducing two modes designed host mode and
guest mode and a new instruction VMRUN.
As in the case of the AMD64-based processor, which boots in legacy x86 mode in order
to be compatible with 32-bit operating system, the AMD-V processor boots up in legacy
“guest mode”, until a compatible VMM is turned on and the VMRUN instruction is issued.
When this happens, the processor shifts into host mode, similar to what happens when
the 64-bit operating system would active the x64 mode on an AMD64 previously started
as 32-bit. The “turn on” operation that will enable the VMM it is a bit called Secure
Virtual Machine Enable (SVME). The extended-feature-enable register (EFER) is a model-
specific register (MSR) with an address of C000_0080h and it can only be read or write by
privileged software.
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Figure 4.2: Extended feature enable register (EFER)
As we can see on the Figure 4.2, on the bit 12 we can find the SVME bit. This bit has to be
set to 1 before any SVM instruction is executed.
The VMRUN instruction is the keystone of SVM. The VMM calls the VMRUN instruction
that has an implicit addressing mode of [rAX]. The VMRUN will then take the Virtual
Machine Control Block (VMBC). This VMBC, in a simplified way, describes a guest to be
executed and has the settings that determine what actions cause the guest to exit to host.
The system switches into guest mode, booting up its own operating system that will run
in its own ring 0 privileged-mode instructions, and its own applications at the ring 3. This
guest will run until it takes an action that causes an exit to the host or if it clearly (legal
or illegal) calls the VMM (using the VMMCALL instruction). When this happens, the
information about the intercepted event is written on the VMCB and the host resumes at
the instruction following VMRUN, as we can see on the Figure 4.3.
Anything made by the guest operating system that causes an interrupt or execute a ring 0
command will make the VMM taking control of it in the Host mode. Therefore we can
say that using host mode is more secure and efficient than using virtualization carried out
exclusively in software [69].
Intel VT works in a similar way to AMD-V and so it is not going to be detail the process,
only during the explanation of Blue Pill.
Currently, all of the most important open source virtualization projects (e.g. Xen, KVM,
VirtualBox) and comercial solutions (e.g. VMware, Parallels, Oracle VM) supports both
AMD-V and Intel VT.
52
Figure 4.3: Workflow of the host and guest mode
The idea regarding Blue Pill is that the attacked machine has the process running in Ring
0 privileged-mode like the kernel-mode drivers. Then it will check if it has support for
hardware VM, and if it does, enable it in the extended features enable register (AMD-V:
EFER.SVME, Intel VT: CR4.VMXE). Then it is allocated a memory region for storing host
and guest data on transitions and the VMBC (or VMCS in case of Intel VT) is prepared
in order to treat the #VMEXIT handler. After this, the hypervisor will execute the guest-
entering instruction (AMD-V:VMRUN, Intel VT: VMLAUNCH), and this way will control
the native operating system, which will have no clue that is running inside a hypervisor.
Figure 4.4: The Blue Pill idea (simplified) [1]
4.2.4.2 SubVirt
SubVirt [70] is a VMBR rootkit created by researchers at Microsoft Research and the Uni-
versity of Michigan. The name is a combining portions of the words subvert and virtual.
Subvert is one of the abilities that rootkits use to trick the operating system into believing
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the rootkit does not exist.
SubVirt makes use of VirtualPC or VMware in its own area of disk space that is totally
undetectable and off-limits to the host operating system. SubVirt operates at a level below
the host kernel and remains inaccessible to the host operating system. The original host
operating system is placed inside a virtual machine. The boot sequence is modified by the
kernel module to load original operating system inside the Virtual PC (or VMware in case
of a Linux).
This rootkit survives a restart, but needs an inicial restart in order to be installed.
Differences Between SubVirt and Blue Pill
As previously said, SubVirt is a restart-surviving rootkit. In fact it needs an initial restart in
order of the SubVirt’s installation process takes control before the original operating system
boots. In contrast, Blue Pill does not require any restart and can be installed ’on-the-fly’.
SubVirt was implemented on x86 hardware, which does not allow to achieve 100 percent
virtualization. There are number of sensitive instructions, which are not privileged on an
x86 hardware, like SIDT/SGDT/SLDT. Blue Pill relies on AMD64 SVM technology.
SubVirt is based on one of the commercial VMM: Virtual PC and/or VMWare. Both of
these applications create virtual devices, which can be easily detected by the guest machine.
Blue Pill is a thin hypervisor, and the hardware is accessible without loss of performance
(e.g. the 3D graphics card stays with the same performance as if there was no hypervisor).
4.2.4.3 Detecting VMBR and Ways to Protect Against These Attacks
When BluePill was presented for the first time, Joanna declared it was 100 percent unde-
tectable. That was proven to be wrong. Later on the same year, many investigators claimed
that, by using external timing, they could detect Blue Pill. They argue that executing some
instruction in a none virtual machine, it takes some certain time, but doing the same ope-
ration inside a virtual environment, it will take much longer. Based on this, they can tell if
it is in a virtual machine or not. Although this is true, without any baseline comparison, as
the time required for the same machine to run the same number of interactions of the same
instructions before and after the system has been virtualized, then it will not be possible
to compare correctly, and by that, detect that it is running inside a hypervisor is almost
impossible.
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In 2007, Keith Adams et al. [71] suggest that by using translation lookaside buffers (TLBs)
it was possible to detect Blue Pill. In the paper, the authors claim that, because VMM and
guest virtual address mappings competes for the same pool of TLB, the guest OS could
detect that it is running inside a VMM since the size would be smaller.
However, not all VMBR are hard to detect. For instance, in order to survive reboots,
SubVirt change the master boot record of the hard disk, and so it can be detected, even
for “off line” detection. Nevertheless, it is a fact that detecting a VMBR is a hard job to
do, although not impossible. In the same paper, the authors suggest that people should not
focus on the detection but in the prevention, because it is easier.
The simpler way would be the suggestion of Microsoft by disabling hardware virtualization
extensions by default for client-side systems. This solution in fact would prevent VMBR
to install, but it would also disable legitimate usages of virtualization. A small workaround
to this is provided by AMD-V, which allows the SVM to be re-enabled using a 64-bit key
introduced by the user for the valid hypervisor. If a malicious hypervisor would attempt to
install, it would fail because it does not have the necessary key.
Another possibility would be using Trusted Platform Module (TPM) provided by Intel’s
Trusted Execution Technology (formerly LaGrande) or AMD’s SVM. This would allow
the CPU to reboot into a trusted state using a TPM verified secure loader.
Two more things could be done in order to avoid VMBR. A simple approach could be by
doing a safe boot from CD. The second idea could be by installing a trusted hypervisor first.
This idea has the drawback that it requires IOMMU/VT-d support, otherwise the VMBR
could write on the hypervisor’s page in memory and again, take control of the system [72].
Some security expertises have seen VMBR as impractical to implement in production sys-
tems. The main reason is related with system resources. Virtual machines place quite a
drain on those, particularly memory and disk space. For instance, it would be hard an ad-
ministrator miss the disk space occupied by a VMBR like SubVirt, which is installed with
its own operating system. The technology advance can make these detections more diffi-
cult, since servers have more and more memory and disk space, although also VM tend to
be bigger and occupy more. Nevertheless, if they turn out to be a reality outside the labs,
then this type of malware can become extremely dangerous.
4.2.5 The Intrusion Detection/Prevention Approach
VMware, as one of the leaders on virtualization, has an important role to play on VM
security. Therefore, they implement advanced techniques in order to provide transparent
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traffic analysis and threat interception. Recently they released VMsafe APIs, which can
alert about an on-going attack, in the same way as an IDS, or can terminate open malicious
sessions, like an IPS. However, VM security is not only limited to this. In an article about
Taming Virtualization, Carbone et al. [73] proposed GuardHype. With the focus on VMBR
prevention, GuardHype acts like a hypervisor for hypervisor, because it controls the access
of hypervisors to the hardware’s virtualization extensions. Using the same technique as
Blue Pill, it emulates the CPU’s virtualization extensions, allowing third-party hypervisors
to run unmodified on top of it. During my investigation, I have exchanged some emails with
Carbone. He told that currently there is no implementation of GuardHype, but that Phoenix
(the BIOS manufacturer) has a project called HyperSpace which implements a very similar
concept to the one proposed by them. HyperSpace has a “small hypervisor which supports
nested virtualization and an additional security domain where security applications can be
deployed”, he told me. Therefore, in his opinion, in the near feature it would be thinkable
to imagine GuardHype as being a component of our BIOSes. There has been some study
in this field to enable hypervisors to detect any malicious modification inside a VM. Both
Manitou [74] and Patagonix [39] use a hypervisor to detect and identify stealthily executing
binaries on a computer system.
4.2.6 The Revert to Snapshots Problem
A disk ”snapshot” is a mechanism used by some well known VMMs (e.g. VMware and
VirtualBox) which allows the administrator to take a snapshot of the Guest machine at
a certain point in time. What it does is to preserve the disk file system and the system
memory, allowing the administrator to revert to the snapshot in case of necessity.
They can be lifesavers but they can bring some security problems too. For instance, revert
to a snapshot can:
• Insert an un-patched vulnerable machine online again
• Re-enable previous disabled accounts or passwords
• Use old security policies (e.g. firewall rules, antivirus signatures)
However, it can have other security problems. Galfinkel et al. [75] alerts for the pro-
blem of using snapshots on systems with one-time password system like S/KEY [76]. The
consequence of revert a snapshot can be as serious as the attacker had previously sniffed
password that can now use, and this way compromise the security of the infrastructure.
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Another problem of using snapshots can be found on systems that use protocols that rely
on the “freshness” of their random number source. Authentication algorithms is indeed
a problem to be concerned when enabling snapshots. Zero Knowledge Proofs of Know-
ledge (ZKPK) [77] are not secure if the same random nonces are used more than once, and
therefore, many of the authentication protocols derived from ZKPK such as Fiat-Shamir
authentication [78] or Schorr authentication [79] will be insure if a snapshot is reverted.
However, not only the cryptographic protocols are affected. For instance, the reuse of TCP
initial sequence number could allow an attacker to do a TCP hijacking attack [80].
4.2.7 Vulnerability Analysis of VMware ESX and Xen
When thinking about vulnerabilities, hypervisors are one of the most sensitive pieces of
software on a computer, as they are the door to access virtual machines. They are used
for many propose and in many different environments, by professionals and amateurs. Hy-
pervisors, as said before, should have the less possible lines of codes to make it lighter to
run but also to allow the less vulnerability. However, are they really secure? How many
vulnerabilities were reported and what would be the impact if it was exploitable?
In [81], the authors do an analysis of the number of patches released for the VMware ESX.
Their study was about the number of patches released for this version based on the infor-
mation on the VMware’s website, which only had information from VMware ESX 3 and
above. Moreover, the authors group these patches in critical, security and general patches.
This gives an idea of the number of patches but does not give an idea of how secure is the
product. Our approach is different. We study the number and severity of CVEs reported
for both VMware ESX and Xen. The database available of Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) is very detailed and with a good registry of old versions of both pro-
ducts. This gives a good idea of the security for along the years. We also compare both
products, trying to understand if any of them can be considered more secure and which one
has higher severity vulnerabilities reported.
While there are other hypervisors that one could consider, VMware ESX and Xen ultima-
tely represent the forefront of efforts and claims with respect to hypervisors and security,
and likely suffer higher levels of scrutiny by security researchers than other hypervisor
solutions.
Questioned about if it was correct to compare VMware ESX with Xen, Keith Adams ans-
wered me saying “the closest products in spirit and capabilities are probably ESXi and Xen.
I think ESX is fair to compare, too, if you exclude security problems from the user-level
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Figure 4.5: Severity of the vulnerabilities reported
component of ESX; the user-level portion of ESX is essentially Linux, so it inherits all of
its security advisories”.
With that context in mind, I am going to undertake a security analysis of these two solutions
regarding software vulnerabilities. I considered VMware ESX and VMware ESXi as the
same product, and considered Xen or Citrix Xenserver as the same product.
This analysis was based on the CVEs [62] reported on the National Vulnerability Database
[82] and it was made in August of 2009.The CVE naming conventions and process is known
worldwide as being the most comprehensive list of vulnerabilities across software products
of all types.
VMware released VMware ESX 1.0 (Elastic Sky X) in 2001 and has subsequently released
VMware ESX 1.5 (2002), 2.0 (2003), 2.5 (2004), 3.0(2006), VMware ESX 3.5 (2007) and
VMware ESX 4.0 (2009) . The first public release of Xen was in 2003 and since then, new
releases have been made. The current stable version is 3.4.
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) does the following equation in order to
find the CVSS Severity Score: (0.6*Impact +0.4*Exploitability-1.5)*f(Impact). The value
of f(Impact) can have one of the following two values: If Impact is zero then f(Impact)
is also zero, otherwise it will be 1.176. The value of Impact and Exploitability is more
complex and its explanation can be found in [83].
Since the release of VMware ESX 1.0 in 2001, VMware has fixed 26 vulnerabilities in
supported ESX products – 7 HIGH severity, 15 MEDIUM severity and 4 LOW severity.
Xen had the first public release in 2003, however the first CVE is dated from 2007. From
that date until June of 2009 it was reported 18 vulnerabilities regarding Xen –3 HIGH
severity, 13 MEDIUM severity and 2 LOW severity.
The graphic on the Figure 4.5 shows that, although these two products were first released
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Month/
Year
CVSS
Severity
Impact
Subscore
Exploitability
Subscore
12/03 7,2 10 3,9
12/05 7,6 10 4,9
12/05 6,8 6,4 8,6
12/05 2,1 2,9 3,9
12/05 4,9 6,9 3,9
12/05 4,3 2,9 8,6
07/06 5 2,9 10
07/06 3,6 4,9 3,9
04/07 5 2,9 10
04/07 6,6 10 2,7
01/08 7,5 6,4 10
06/08 4,4 6,4 3,4
06/08 6,9 10 3,4
06/08 9 10 8
06/08 7,2 10 3,9
09/08 2,1 2,9 3,9
10/08 5 2,9 10
10/08 6,8 10 3,1
11/08 6,9 10 3,4
11/08 9,3 10 8,6
12/08 7,2 10 3,9
02/09 4,7 6,9 3,4
04/09 6,8 10 1
04/09 2,1 2,9 3,9
04/09 4,6 6,9 3,1
06/09 4 6,9 1,9
Table 4.1: VMware ESX CVSS severity analysis from 2003 until 2009
with two years difference, VMware is the product with more vulnerabilities, especially the
ones classified as HIGH. However, Xen as a number of MEDIUM severities very close to
the ones of VMware. We are going to analyze each product individually.
VMware ESX As we can see on Table 4.1, from the 26 occurrences since 2003, 7 had
CVSS Severity score equal or above 7 which is considered severity High. In addition, 6
had a score above 6 (close to the High severity) and 15 are considered of severity Medium.
Figure 4.6 shows the incidence reported for VMware ESX and their severity. Around 70
percent of vulnerabilities considered High was reported in 2008 while the ones considered
Medium were equality dived between 2005 and 2009. On those seven high vulnerabilities,
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Figure 4.6: VMware ESX CVSS severity from 2003 until 2009
around 60 percent were network exploitable while 40 percent were local exploitable.
In order to have a deeper analysis of the vulnerabilities reported, it was made a study
regarding all the VMware ESX’s CVE analyzed, grouped by the type of attack and the
access vector.
As a result, all the Low Severity CVEs are classify as Information Disclosure, while most
of the High Severity CVEs are Host Privilege Escalation exploitable by network. Most of
these are possible because the newer versions of ESX have a web server in order to use the
client vSphere to management the server and so have a new door for attacks. For the same
reason is able to do XSS attacks against the ESX.
XEN As we can see on the table 4.3, from the 18 occurrences since 2003, 3 had CVSS
Severity score equal or above 7 which is considered severity High. In addition, 3 had a
score near 7 (close to the High severity) and 13 are considered of severity Medium.
Figure 4.7 shows the incidence of the severity. All the vulnerabilities considered High was
reported in 2008 while the ones considered Medium were equally divided between 2007
and 2008 (with six reported in each year). On those three high vulnerabilities, all were
local exploitable.
In order to have a more deep analyze of the vulnerabilities reported, it was made a study
regarding all the Xen’s CVE analyzed, grouped by the type of attack and the access vector.
As a result, most of the vulnerabilities reported are related with DoS, some of them consi-
dered of severity High. Many of these DoS would affect services on the host. It was
considered VM Escapes only the vulnerabilities that explicit execute code on the Host and
not the ones that access memory in order to crash the hypervisor.
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Attack Access Vector CVE Impact
Denial of Service
Locally
exploitable
CVE-2008-4916(M-GH)
CVE-2009-1805(M-OG)
CVE-2008-4914(M-GH)
CVE-2008-4917(H-GH)
CVE-2008-2100(H-GH)
CVE-2007-1271(M-O?)
CVE-2005-4773(M-OH)
Violates the condition of
Isolation and allows an
attacker to consume all
the resources available.
Network
exploitable
CVE-2008-4309(M)
CVE-2007-1270(M)
A remote attacker who
issued a specially crafted
request could cause a
service to crash.
VM Escape Locally
exploitable
CVE-2009-1244(M)
CVE-2008-2100(H)
Violates the condition of
Isolation allowing code
execution on the host
system from the guest
system
Guest Privilege
Escalation
Locally
exploitable
CVE-2008-4915(M)
CVE-2008-4279(M)
CVE-2007-5671(M)
CVE-2007-1271 (M)
Allows an user in a guest
machine to gain
privileges
Host Privilege
Escalation
Locally
exploitable
CVE-2008-2100(H)
CVE-2008-0967(M)
CVE-2003-1291 (H)
Allow users with
non-privileged accounts
to gain root privileges
Network
exploitable
CVE-2008-2097(H)
CVE-2007-5360(H)
CVE-2008-4281(H)
Information
disclosure
vulnerability
Locally
exploitable
CVE-2005-3620(L)
CVE-2006-3589(L)
CVE-2009-0518(L)
CVE-2008-2101(L)
An attacker can access
sensitive information
Network
exploitable
CVE-2006-2481(M)
CVE-2005-4583 (M)
XSS Attack Network
exploitable
CVE-2005-3619(M)
CVE-2005-3618(H)
An unauthorized user
could construct a
specially crafted URL
that might change some
information or do Cross
Site Request Forgery
Legend: (L) – Low, (M) – Medium, (H) – High, (OH) – Only on Host, (GH) – Guest
operating system can affect the Host, (OG) – Only on Guest
Table 4.2: Analysis of each VMware ESX CVE reported
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Month/
Year
CVSS
Severity
Impact
Subscore
Exploitability
Subscore
03/07 4,3 2,9 8,6
09/07 6,9 10 3,4
10/07 6 9,2 2,7
11/07 4,7 6,9 3,4
11/07 4,7 6,9 3,4
12/07 4,6 6,4 3,9
12/07 2,1 2,9 3,9
04/08 4,3 2,9 8,6
05/08 2,1 2,9 3,9
05/08 7,2 10 3,9
05/08 4,9 6,9 3,9
06/08 5 2,9 10
07/08 4,3 2,9 8,6
08/08 6,8 6,4 8,6
10/08 7,2 10 3,9
11/08 6,9 10 3,4
12/08 7,2 10 3,9
05/09 5 2,9 10
Table 4.3: Xen CVSS severity analysis from 2003 until 2009
Figure 4.7: Xen CVSS severity from 2003 until 2009
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Attack Access Vector CVE Impact
Denial of Service
Locally
exploitable
CVE-2008-5716(H-GH)
CVE-2008-4405(H-GH)
CVE-2008-3687(M-GH)
CVE-2007-5498(M-GH)
CVE-2008-1944(H-OH)
CVE-2008-1943(L-OH)
CVE-2007-5907(M-GH)
CVE-2007-5906(M-GH)
CVE-2007-3919(M-OH)
CVE-2007-4993(M-GH)
Violates the condition of
Isolation and allows an
attacker to consume all
the resources available.
Network
exploitable
CVE-2009-1758(M-OG)
CVE-2008-1952(M-OG)
CVE-2008-1619(M-OH)
A remote attacker who
issued a specially crafted
request could cause a
service to crash.
VM Escape Locally
exploitable
CVE-2007-4993(M)
CVE-2008-3687 (M)
Violates the condition of
Isolation allowing code
execution on the host
system from the guest
system
Guest Privilege
Escalation
Locally
exploitable
CVE-2008-3687(M) Allows an user in a guest
machine to gain
privileges
Host Privilege
Escalation
Locally
exploitable
CVE-2008-4993(M)
CVE-2008-1944(H)
CVE-2008-1943(L)
CVE-2007-3919(M)
Allow users with
non-privileged accounts
to gain root privileges
Network
exploitable
Information
disclosure
vulnerability
Locally
exploitable
CVE-2007-6207(L)
CVE-2007-6416(M)
CVE-2007-0998(M)
An attacker can access
sensitive information
Network
exploitable
XSS Attack Network
exploitable
CVE-2008-3253(M) An unauthorized user
could construct a
specially crafted URL
that might change some
information or do Cross
Site Request Forgery
Legend: (L) – Low, (M) – Medium, (H) – High, (OH) – Only on Host, (GH) – Guest
operating system can affect the Host, (OG) – Only on Guest
Table 4.4: Analysis of each Xen CVE reported
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4.2.8 Conclusion
Most of the vulnerabilities in VMware ESX have been discovered since 2006 and 70
percent of vulnerabilities considered High was reported in 2008. In the case of Xen, the
first vulnerability was reported in 2007 and 100 percent of the High severity vulnerabilities
were discovered in 2008. The reason for this, in my opinion, is that with the increase in
popularity, relevance and deployment of virtualization, also vulnerability discovery gain a
new liveliness with the goal on finding ways to exploit virtualization technologies.
Virtualization does not mean security or replace security. In fact, virtualization brings a
more complex and risky security environment. Virtualization adds a new layer to what we
had before. Operating system and applications always coexisted. Now they are being pa-
cked in a box called virtualization. However, there are vulnerabilities in operating systems
and applications no matter if they are running on a virtual environment or not. Combining
to that, we are now adding vulnerabilities with the virtualization software, not forgetting
VMBRs. Moreover, using virtualization, we are consolidating our virtual environment in
one physical target were by using a DoS or VM Escape, it is possible to exploit one system,
accessing and controlling other virtual systems on that target or even the server itself.
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Chapter 5
VM Solutions for Online Banking and
e-Commerce
Talking about end user’s computers is also talking about security. Although nowadays,
personal computers and even office computers are much more protected against virus and
malwares than five to ten years ago, the truth is that its security level is still low. From
my own experience, while I was responsible for a Public key infrastructure (PKI) solution,
I went to some desktops in a public institution, and on some of them, despite the fact it
was installed an antivirus software, the user had a lot of add-ons (toolbars) installed on the
Internet Browser (IE) and some other uselessness tools on the desktop background. It was
the typical user that clicks “Yes” to any window asking permission for an operation. Later,
in another project, I was responsible for an antivirus project of another public institution
and our days was the management of the antivirus of a big farm of machines, most of them
desktops. Although there were majority updated in terms of antivirus signature file, there
were always some virus found every day. In addition, when we discovered a computer that
did not have antivirus software installed, the number of virus in that machines was nor-
mally high. Virus and malwares increase every day and are more and more intelligent in
the way they infect a machine and spread to others but also in the social engineering they
do to deceive the end user to install them. I consider myself a little paranoid about home
security, for instance in my Windows XP, I have an antivirus software, an host intrusion
prevention system (HIPS) software and firewall software. Moreover all the software instal-
led (including the operating system) are totally updated to the last stable version. However,
some years ago, I have almost installed a virus in my machine received in a normal mail
supposedly sent by one of the persons I trust. This virus was not detected by the antivirus
product but the HIPS alerted me by the fact of that simple file was trying to write in a
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specific directory and on the registry. At that time I figured out that something was wrong
and I canceled all the actions the virus was trying to do, and alerted the person who sent me
the email for that fact. Other common friend received the same email and he lost almost
all the files he had on his computer. With that, he learns to be more careful the next time
he receives an email, but as any human being, time turns you softer when facing a lower
risk. Normally, the home user only realizes its computer is infected when its start to act
uncommonly, but some virus can be installed and does not show any presence. Some of
them are the ones that attack home banking and they only start to do something when it
detects the user is accessing a specific online banking website.
According to Rachwald [84] “people who are not particularly tech savvy have a tough time
differentiating between good online security practices and bad online security practices”.
Although I know some cases where this does not apply, I believe this is the common rule.
Physical security is more intuitive for people than the IT world. A person would not leave
her home key on the door or left alone in an easy place to find, but more easily, they write
their password on a post-it and put it under the keyboard or even on the monitor.
In October 1994, Stanford Federal Credit Union introduced the first online banking ser-
vice in United States. Since then, banks have come to understand that security is a major
concern, and they have to evolve with it, adapting their solution to face new attacks. The
number of users has been growing over the years. In 2006, the number of online banking
consumers in the US grew to 44 millions. According with a study of Ponemon Institute
made in 2006, 34 percent of customers would change their bank after one breach and 45
percent would leave after two breaches. This indicated how serious would be the impact
of an attack to one of the top 10 online banks. Nowadays, phishing is still a problem and
normally they can be done in two ways:
• Redirect the user to a different webpage with the same layout as the original one,
using a link received by an email, or using a virus that redirects the user to that
webpage.
• Allowing the user to access the legitimate webpage but use a virus installed on the
computer to deface the webpage, asking for some extra information the legitimate
webpage would not ask like the data of the online banking consumer’s TAN list.
Virtualization could have a role to play in order to protect the consumer. We are going to
describe some solutions for a homer user to use online banking or ebay in a more secure
way.
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5.1 The Three Colors Solution
The idea of this solution is to provide an isolated environment where the user could perform
sensitive tasks as online banking, or e-commerce or semi-sensitive task as updating its own
blog or even non sensitive task as surfing in the internet, or downloading P2P files. Since
these are isolated environment, it is safe to do any of this operation because it will not
affect the host system neither the other virtual machines. We have organized the solution
to use three virtual machines, each one with a different purpose. The one we are going to
use only for online banking is the one that requires more security attention and because of
that, we are going to designate as the Red VM. If the user does some online shop using
eBay or Amazon, it will require a safe VM but with few lower requirements and so will
designate this one as the Yellow VM. The Green VM is the one where the user can surf
freely on the Internet, accessing anywhere, even the websites considered dangerous. Table
5.1 resumes the purpose of each virtual machine. The Red VM, as said before, it will
be used exclusively for online banking. The Yellow VM it is going to be used for fewer
sensitive operations but those that still need some care. The list presented on the Yellow
VM column is not restricted to the items presented. The user could do some other activities
that he identifies as sensitive operations. The Green VM is where the user should have all
the freedom to do anything.
Red VM Yellow VM Green VM
Online Banking e-Commerce
Update blog / website
SSH connections
Stock Market websites
Other sensitive operations
Check e-mails on yahoo/gmail/hotmail
Googling
Search for information of exploits
Youtube videos
Online games
Adult websites
IRC channels
etc...
Table 5.1: Resume of the purpose of the three virtual machines
We are going to describe the solution purposed using only open source software available
free and that any user could install on his computer. Moreover, this solution can be used
with any common desktop operating system such as Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X or
Linux.
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5.1.1 Design of the Solution
For each VM it is necessary an operating system hardened to run faster and have higher
security level. Since Microsoft Windows requires licenses for each installation, this opera-
ting system is not an option. Therefore, we choose Linux to be installed on each VM. The
question now was which distribution to use and how it is going to be used. There are many
options and the home user can use any of them, each one with its benefits and drawbacks.
Some of them are described on table 5.2.
Option Pros Cons
LiveCD from any Linux/BSD
Distribution
It is easy to
download and run;
Fresh run each
time
It brings more
software than
needed and it runs
in memory
Install a full Linux The user choose
the distribution it is
more used and
install it
It requires some
knowledge to
install only the
necessary packets.
SUSE Studio Customizable
distribution with
only the packages
the user wants
Some steps are
necessary and
requires some
knowledge
Table 5.2: Comparison of different solutions
Any distribution is good if the user is already familiar with it, however for the Red and
Yellow VM it is recommended a hardened Linux since we only need the kernel, a Windows
Manager to run the browser, a browser and a pdf reader. This will make the VM to be light
and run with few requirements, fulfilling better its goal. Because of this, we have chosen
Novell’s SUSE Studio [85].
The solution adopted is a type 2 virtualization and the software chose was Sun VirtualBox
because it is free, small and there are versions for Microsoft Windows, Linux and Mac.
The design of the solution is described on Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: The solution’s components
We are going to describe the steps used to install the software and to run the VM but for
further detail, we recommend to consult the Sun’s VirtualBox Manual [86]. We are going
to describe the steps necessary in order to install and run the three VMs. I am assuming the
user is running Microsoft Windows with administrations rights and knows how to install
an application.
5.1.2 Setup of the Solution
The first step is to customize the Linux distribution we are going to use with only the
browser and few more things. We want to simplify the process and not use advanced
configurations like replace the /boot/grub/menu.lst file with one that does not show the
Failsafe option, or replace introduce some add-ons on Firefox. The goal is to produce
something any user could do without many “blind” steps.
The user should access to SUSE Studio website [85] and create an account. At the time of
writing this thesis, SUSE Studio was an invite-only service, but I have request an invitation
that was received in less than 10 minutes. Once the user’s invite arrives, he can sign into
SUSE Studio with his Google or Yahoo account, or any OpenID provider. Once the users
sign successfully, it can start the creating of the customized VMs.
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5.1.2.1 Creating the Red VM
1. Go to "Home" and click on the "Create new appliance" link in the upper-right.
2. On the subsection "OpenSUSE 11.1" (which is the current version as the thesis is
written) click on the link "Minimal X"
3. Go to the bottom of the page and make sure the option "32-bit" is select on "Select
your architecture"
4. On the subsection "Name your appliance", introduce "Red VM" and click on "Create
appliance"
5. After this, the Start menu will show asking you to navigate through the tabs to gene-
rate the appliance. The first is software, and the user should click in the tab "Soft-
ware" or in "Switch to the Software tab to continue" link.
6. Based on the selection the user has made previously, SUSE Studio already selected
the Linux basic to boot and the few packages as the Windows Manager. However,
we want to install also the web browser and a pdf reader. OpenSUSE 11.1 comes
with version 3.0.x version of Firefox, but we want the most recent one, which is at
the time the version 3.5.x. For this, it is necessary to add the Mozilla repository, by
clicking on "Add repositories" on the section "Software sources".
7. Now we need to write "Mozilla" under "Add and remove repositories" and click on
"+ add" for "Mozilla openSUSE_11.1".
8. Another repository is necessary to add in order to have the guest tools of VirtualBox
already installed. It is necessary to search for "VirtualBox" and then and click on "+
add" for "Virtualization:VirtualBox 11.1"
9. Click on the link "back to the software overview" on the top of the page.
10. Now we are able to add the last version of Firefox and XPDF. The use should now
go to "Search for software" and find for firefox.
11. Choose "MozillaFirefox" by click "+add" on the left of it. If all goes well, the but-
ton should change for "remove" and a "mark" should appear. Note also that a new
section appeared on the left saying "Software changes" and showing "Added Mo-
zillaFirefox".
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12. In order to add XPDF, the user must search for "xpdf" and select it the same way he
have done on the previous step.
13. Some online bank’s website requires flash player. In order to add Flash, the user must
search for "flash-player" and select it the same way he have done on the previous step.
14. It is also necessary to add the Guest Tools of VirtualBox, and so it is necessary to
search and add "virtualbox-ose-guest-tools" as we have done in the previous step.
We have found later an important bug when we use IceWM with auto login. What happens
is that after the auto login, the keyboard does not work anymore and few less important
bugs happened too. After deep investigation, it was found that the problem was on the
login manager and because of this, it was necessary to add KDE Display Manager (KDM),
which is a graphical login interface. After this replace, all the bugs noticed before no longer
existed. The drawback of this solution is that adds 50MB of packages. Because of this bug,
an extra step is necessary that is search for kdebase3-kdm and add it.
1. The next step is related with the configuration and so it is necessary to click on
“Configuration” on top of the page, next to Start.
2. The first sub tab that is selected by default is “General”. In this tab it, the user can
select the language he wants, the keyboard layout he will use (if it is a keyboard
from US then he should choose English (US) but if it is a Portuguese keyboard then
he should choose Portuguese) and some other definitions as default time zone and
network. In this screen, the configuration purposed are:
• Default locale
Language: English (US)
− Keyboard Layout: English (US)
Default time zone
− Region: USA
− Time Zone: Eastern (New York)
Network
− Discover network setting automatically (DHCP)
Firewall
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− Enable firewall
· Open SSH port (22): disabled
· Open HTTP ports (80,443): disabled
Users and groups:
− Login: root
· Password: [user’s password]
· Group: root
· Home directory: /root
· Shell: /bin/bash
− Replace the user tux by a new one.
− Login: onlinebanking
· Password: [user’s password]
· Group: users
· Home directory: /home/onlinebanking
· Shell: /bin/bash
1. The next sub tab to configure is “Personalize”. In this section, it is possible to confi-
gure the logo and the background. We have selected the “Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity” logo and for background, the “FCUL C8 Building” - which won the Valmor
award – with a red layer.
2. On the “StartUp” sub tab, we can select the runlevel. The user should select:
• 5: Graphical Login
1. We can skip the sub tab Server, because we will not install any MySQL database.
2. On the "Desktop" sub tab, the following options should be selected:
• Automatic desktop user log in
Automatic log in user: onlinebanking – enabled
Autostart desktop programs
− Command: firefox
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− Start for User: onlinebanking
− Comment: Starts Mozilla Firefox
− Enabled: Checked
1. On the “Storage & Memory” the following configurations are purposed:
• Virtual appliance
Ram size: 512 MB – If the user has 1GB or more of RAM, them this is the
purposed valued. If the user has an old PC with less than 1GB, then we suggest
at least 256 MB for the RAM size value.
− Virtual disk size: 2 GB
Disk Image
− Swap partition: 512 MB
1. On the “Scripts” sub tab, the following options should be:
• Run script at the end of the build: Disabled
Run script whenever the appliance boots: Disabled
1. Now the user should click on the “Overlay files” tab. In this section no entries should
exist. If there is any, the user should delete it.
2. On the “Build” tab, the user should select:
• Format: VMware/VirtualBox (.vmdk)
Version: 1.0.0
1. Then click on the button “Build”. After this, a progress bar should appear. It is
necessary to wait until the VMware/VirtualBox image is created and a Download
link is available.
2. When the download link is available, it is necessary to click on it and save the file on
the user’s hard drive. The file will have around 300MB.
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3. After it completes its download, it is necessary to uncompress the tar.gz. Microsoft
XP does not provide a program for this, and so we recommend an open source file
archive called 7-ZIP [87].
At this point, the creating of the Red VM is made. However, is it still necessary the Yellow
VM and the Green VM.
5.1.2.2 Creating the Yellow VM
For the Yellow VM we can clone the Red VM and only change the name, the personaliza-
tion and the user name.
1. Go to the “Home” tab and put the cursor on top of “Red VM”. A yellow box will
appear showing the “Clone” link. Click on that link.
2. Rename the appliance name:
• Appliance Name: Yellow VM
1. Go to the “Configuration” tab and under “General” the user should change the user
“onlinebanking” for the new one which can be:
• Login: onlineshopping
Password: [user’s password]
− Group: users
− Home directory: /home/ onlineshop
− Shell: /bin/bash
1. On the sub tab “Personalize”, the user should change the background for something
different, so it can easily identify it is in the yellow VM. We have selected the “Car-
negie Mellon University” logo and for background, the “FCUL C8 Building” with a
yellow layer.
2. On the sub tab “Desktop” the user should check if the user is equal to the one intro-
duced on the step 3:
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• Start for User: onlineshopping
1. The user can go now directly to the tab “Build” and do the same as for the Red VM:
• Format: VMware/VirtualBox (.vmdk)
Version: 1.0.0
1. Then click on the button “Build”. After this, a progress bar should appear. It is
necessary to wait until the image is created and a Download link is available.
2. When the download link is available, it is necessary to click on it and save the file on
the user’s hard drive. The file will have also around 300MB.
5.1.2.3 Creating the Green VM
To create the Green VM, we are going to use other template. The following steps should
be made:
1. Go to “Home” and click on the “Create new appliance” link in the upper-right.
2. On the subsection “OpenSUSE 11.1” (which is the current version as the thesis is
written) click on the link “KDE 4 desktop”.
3. Go to the bottom of the page and make sure the option “32-bit” is select on “Select
your architecture”
4. On the subsection “Name your appliance”, introduce “GreenVM” and click on “Create
appliance”
5. After this, the Start menu will show asking you to navigate through the tabs to gene-
rate the appliance. The first is software, and the user should click in the tab “Soft-
ware” or in “Switch to the Software tab to continue” link.
6. On the “Software” tab click on “Add repositories” on the section “Software sources”.
7. Now we need to write “Mozilla” under “Add and remove repositories” and click on
“+ add” for “Mozilla openSUSE_11.1”.
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8. Another repository is necessary to add in order to have the guest tools of VirtualBox
already installed. It is necessary to search for “VirtualBox” and then and click on “+
add” for “Virtualization:VirtualBox 11.1”
9. Click on the link “back to the software overview” on the top of the page.
10. The Green VM will be used for the end user surf on the Internet without any restric-
tion and so, some extra programs may be necessary. We are going list the programs
we purpose for this VM that should be installed like we did for “MozillaFirefox” and
“XPDF”:
• Mozillafirefox
OpenOffice
Flash-player
OpenOffice_org-base
kde4-kate
xpdf
virtualbox-ose-guest-tools
1. The next step is related with the configuration and so it is necessary to click on
“Configuration” on top of the page, next to Start.
2. The first sub tab that is selected by default is “General”. In this tab it, the user can
select the language he wants, the keyboard layout he will use (if it is a keyboard
from US then he should choose English (US) but if it is a Portuguese keyboard then
he should choose Portuguese) and some other definitions as default time zone and
network. In this screen, the configuration purposed are:
• Default locale
Language: English (US)
− Keyboard Layout: English (US)
Default time zone
− Region: USA
− Time Zone: Eastern (New York)
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Network
− Discover network setting automatically (DHCP)
Firewall
− Enable firewall
· Open SSH port (22): disabled
· Open HTTP ports (80,443): disabled
Users and groups:
− Login: root
· Password: [user’s password]
· Group: root
· Home directory: /root
· Shell: /bin/bash
− Replace the user tux by a new one.
− Login: freeuser
· Password: [user’s password]
· Group: users
· Home directory: /home/freeuser
· Shell: /bin/bash
1. The next sub tab to configure is “Personalize”. In this section, it is possible to confi-
gure the logo and the background. We have selected the “Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity” logo and for background, the “FCUL C8 Building” - which won the Valmor
award – with a green layer.
2. On the “StartUp” sub tab, we can select the runlevel. The user should select:
• 5: Graphical Login
1. We can skip the sub tab Server, because we will not install any MySQL database.
2. On the "Desktop" sub tab, the following options should be selected:
• Automatic desktop user log in
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Automatic log in user: freeuser – enabled
Autostart desktop programs
− Command: firefox
− Start for User: freeuser
− Comment: Starts Mozilla Firefox
− Enabled: Checked
1. On the “Storage & Memory” the following configurations are purposed:
• Virtual appliance
Ram size: 512 MB – If the user has 1GB or more of RAM, them this is the
purposed valued. If the user has an old PC with less than 1GB, then we suggest
at least 256 MB for the RAM size value.
− Virtual disk size: 3 GB
Disk Image
− Swap partition: 512 MB
1. On the “Scripts” sub tab, the following options should be:
• Run script at the end of the build: Disabled
Run script whenever the appliance boots: Disabled
1. Now the user should click on the “Overlay files” tab. In this section no entries should
exist. If there is any, the user should delete it.
2. On the “Build” tab, the user should select:
• Format: VMware/VirtualBox (.vmdk)
Version: 1.0.0
1. Then click on the button “Build”. After this, a progress bar should appear. It is
necessary to wait until the VMware/VirtualBox image is created and a Download
link is available.
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2. When the download link is available, it is necessary to click on it and save the file on
the user’s hard drive. The file will have around 300MB.
3. After it completes its download, it is necessary to uncompress the tar.gz. Microsoft
XP does not provide a program for this, and so we recommend an open source file
archive called 7-ZIP [87].
5.1.3 Running the R/Y/G VMs
We have concluded the creating of the three VMs. We are going to describe now how to
use them as a systematic guide.
1. The first step is to go to Sun’s VirtualBox webpage [86] and download the Windows
version of VirtualBox. The version for x86 or 64-bit is the same. This software is the
hypervisor type 2 we are going to use in order to run the VMs.
2. After installing, the user can access it on Start-> Programs -> Sun VirtualBox on
Windows XP and run VirtualBox. When it starts for the first time, it will ask for a
free registration that the user can fill. Then, you will have access to the Sun xVM
VirtualBox console.
3. The first step now is to create a new Virtual Machine. For this, we click on “New”.
4. A welcome window will pop up. We click on “Next”.
5. On the VM Name and OS type we introduce:
• Name: Red VM
OS Type:
− Operating System: Linux
− Version: openSUSE
1. Click on “Next”.
2. On the Memory window, we introduce 512 MB as the Base Memory Size.
3. On the Virtual Hard Disk, we select:
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• Boot Hard Disk (Primary Master): Enabled
Use existing hard disk: Selected.
If this is the first time the user is using VirtualBox, then a message saying <No
Media> appears under the option selected. Press on the folder icon on the right.
A new window opens with the Virtual Media Manager.
Select the option “Add”.
Browse to the folder you have uncompressed the "[color] VM tar.gz" file and
choose the file "[color]_VM.i686-1.0.0.vmdk".
Click on Select
The user will return to the previous window, with the hard disk selected. Click
on Next
1. On the Summary, the user should review the configuration that will be used. If all is
correct, then should click in Finish.
2. Select the VM by doing one click on top of it and on the left panel, click on "General"
and go to "Advanced".
3. If the VM selected is a Red or Yellow VM, then change the "Shared clipboard" option
to "Guest to Host"
4. If the VM selected is the Green VM, then change the "Shared clipboard" option to
"Disabled"
5. To run the virtual machine, it is necessary to select it on the left panel and click
“Start”.
These same steps should be applied for the Yellow VM and Green VM. At the end of this
step, the user have all the three VMs ready to run on the VirtualBox.
5.1.4 Taking Snapshot
Now that we have a clean installation of the three VMs, some extra cares are needed to
enhance the security. The virtual machine would need to be kept up to date and some steps
should be taken:
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• On the Mozilla Firefox Browser
Install the "NoScript" browser plug-in
Install the "Perspectives" browser plug-in from CMU Perspectives webpage
[88].
Set the home page to the banking/shop web site to be used. Remove all book-
marks and add only those that are needed for the online banking or e-commerce
operation.
Disable the option "Remember passwords for sites" on Edit -> Preferences ->
Security.
After doing these steps, and before the user do anything else, it should take a snapshot of
the VM. To do this, it should do:
• Menu Machine -> Take Snapshot.
Snapshot Name: Clean installation
Snapshot Description: This is a clean state of the virtual machine.
The goal of this snapshot it to use it each time the user wants to do online banking or
e-commerce operations. This way, he can use a clean VM. It is necessary to modify the ap-
pliance virtual machine configuration file to revert to its original state after each shutdown.
After the “take snapshot” operation, the user should go to:
• Menu Machine -> Close
• On the “Close Virtual Machine”
Select “Power off the machine”
− Revert to the current snapshot: Enable
For now on, the user just has to start the machine using this snapshot. The restore is fast
and the VM will be secure. However, there can be updates for this machine (as new version
of Firefox or kernel updates) and for security reasons they should be applied. In this case,
the user should revert to the current clean snapshot, update the system using the password
created for the user root and then take a new snapshot, using this snapshot as the current
state.
These same steps should be applied on the Red VM, Yellow VM and Green VM. However,
since it is always reverting to the taken snapshot, all the files downloaded or created on any
of the VMs will be lost.
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5.1.5 Using the Three Color Solution
Now it is possible to use any of the VMs created in a safe way. When the user wants to do
online-banking, it would only have to start the VirtualBox, then run the Red VM and do the
online banking operation he needs. When the user finishes its online baking operations it
should access the VirtualBox menu on the same windows (pressing the right Ctrl to leave
the focus from inside the window) and select Machine -> Close and verify if the option
"Revert to the current snapshot" is enabled. The same procedure should be done for when
the user needs to use the Yellow or Green VM.
Nevertheless, some extra cares should be followed:
• For the Red VM, only use HTTPS connections. This is particularly important if the
host machine is using unsafe networks such as a hotel/airport wireless network.
• It should be avoided running more than one VM at a time since each virtual machine
will consume memory (512 MB by default).
• Every time the user runs one of the VMs, it will run the cleaned snapshot created on
the previous subsection. Therefore, if the user needs to keep something saved on the
Red or Yellow VM, then he can drag&drop the file from the VM to the host machine.
This procedure should only be used for pdf or html files saved by the user from a
trusted website (such as online banking extract or Amazon receipt page).
• The host machine must not be used for web surfing or any other activity that could
put in risk its security.
5.1.6 Security Analyses of this Solution
The solution of using VMs for online banking and e-commerce operation is based on the
assumption that the host machine is reliable. According with the reports from Forrester
of 2007 [89], 95 percent of enterprise desktop runs Microsoft Windows. It is well known
the vulnerabilities that explore this operating system, but although this may seem a strong
assumption, it is not that hard to achieve. Let us assume the computer received a fresh ins-
tallation (without being connected to the Internet), and then it was installed and configured
correctly a personal firewall and an antivirus software. After having all these software ins-
talled, the administrator forced a full updated of them (preferentially still offline) including
the operation system. At this point, we can say the computer has a high security level.
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One of the problems about Microsoft Windows security is the wrong configuration of user’s
privilege. Normally the current user has administrator privileges, which allows him to
install, and change anything in the computer and with that, the user can install virus or
malwares. If the user’s account is configured without these privileges, the computer will
be less unprotected and so more secure.
Our assumption for the three color solution is that the host machine is reliable because it is
well installed and well configured. If not, then there is some attack vectors such as if the
host machine is compromised the virtual machine is vulnerable. For instance, a key logger
on the host machine could capture account credentials typed into the virtual machine. In
table 5.3, we have summarized the security problems an user can face and how this solution
mitigates them.
Security Problem How to mitigate
If the browser have the bank account login
memorized, anyone who have access to the
computer could start the VM and access the
bank account
Each time the VM restarts, it will use a clean
snapshot and therefore, even if the user has
saved the password on the browser on the last
time he used the VM, this information will be
lost.
The user received an email with a link that
goes to a fake site operated by criminals.
Our solution does not protect the activities the
user would do in its host machine, but since
the user has a Firewall, what he could do is to
configure a rule in his host that would block
access to the legitimate bank website. This
way, he would know that if he pressed a link
and that link would show the webpage of his
bank it would be a fake one.
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An attacker access the user’s computer and
with the credentials of that user, replace the
snapshot with one compromised.
The solution to this problem (not presented in
the setup of the solution) could be:
The user have the snapshot file encrypted, and
each time it would use, would have to decryp-
ted it. This way, if it was replaces, unless the
password used to decrypt would be the same,
the user would detect the original snapshot
was changed.
The solution was configured to do auto login
and the snapshot was proposed to be taken af-
ter that, in order to make the user’s life easier.
However if the user had to enter its login each
time he starts the VM, and then if the snapshot
was changed he would notice because the sys-
tem would not ask the password to login.
The user installs a malware or keylogger on
the VM
The VMs are secure against this kind of at-
tacks because the user does not have permis-
sion to install programs as root although there
are keylogger for Linux that can run in user
mode. However, this means the user would
have to download it and execute it. Neverthe-
less, the VM should be used only to access
the online banking and e-commerce websites.
In addition, each time the user starts the VM
it will use a snapshot it was taken in a clean
environment. What could be done extra is to
configure a firewall on the guest machines to
allow only access to the IP’s corresponding to
the online bank websites.
The user installs a malware or keylogger on
the host
This would break the assumption that the host
machine is reliable and the user account is
well configured. Our solution cannot do much
against it.
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An attacker could do a DNS poisoning attack
against the user
The solution as we described before does not
mitigate this problem. What could be done
extra is to configure a firewall on the guest
machines to allow only access to the IP’s cor-
responding to the online bank websites.
The attacker could replace files on the host
system with some that would compromise the
VMs, for example, replace of some of the Vir-
tualBox’s files with some changed by the at-
tacker.
This would break the assumption that the host
machine is reliable. The solution does not mi-
tigate any attacker that can access locally or
by network on the system and change files.
Physical attacks such as clone the disk so that
the attack can try to break the VMs encrypted
file and after replace the legitimate one with
the one changed by the attacker.
This solution does not mitigate physical at-
tacks.
Table 5.3: Resume of the security problems and how the purposed solution deals with them
From this analysis, there are only few attacks this solution does not mitigate. Those attacks
are possible mainly because we are dependent of the host’s system security. This is the
main disadvantage of this solution. The advantage is that the user does not have to restart
its machine to use it and therefore it is more users friendly.
5.2 The Read-Only Bootable Media Solution
Another security method that allows secure online backing or e-commerce is to use boo-
table read-only media. This can be by using a CD/DVD or USB Flash, although the currents
USB Flash do not allow to protect against write as the old version did and so, they should
not be used. It should only be used read-only media that cannot be changed after creation.
As we have done for the “Three color solution”, this bootable system should be created
and configured with only the services and applications required to perform the necessary
operations. It is possible to create a LiveCD using the SUSE Studio on the option Build
– Create appliance. LiveCD is a CD or DVD with a bootable operating system, normally
Linux. One important configuration is not allowing this bootable media to access the local
hard drive. Since this is a bootable ready-only medium, it would be necessary to restart the
machine and have the option “Boot from CD” activated and configured to run before the
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booting from the hard disk. This way, any malware on the local machine would not affect
the user when using the bootable media. However, this LiveCD can have vulnerabilities,
which can compromise the computer each time it is bootable, as in the AVI model [90]. For
instance, if the LiveCD has a vulnerability that an attack can explore, then an Intrusion may
happen, compromising the system. It is important to generate a new LiveCD from time to
time (for instance, every 2 weeks). SUSE Studio offers a robust update process because
if the user generates a new LiveCD with a different version, it will use the most updated
packages and so there is the trust that the LiveCD built is updated.
Another way could be having a master installation created inside a VM. This VM would
be handled secure and only used to update the master installation. Each week the user
would run this VM and would update it using the available updating mechanisms on that
distribution. If there were any updates applied, then the user should create a new LiveCD
from it. If not, it means the LiveCD in use is still updated. This VM should be securely
stored when not in use, like in a safe external disk.
In table 5.4, we have summarized the security problems an user can face and how this
solution mitigates them.
Security Problem How to mitigate
If the browser have the bank account login
memorized, anyone who have access to the
computer could start the VM and access the
bank account
Since this runs a LiveCD, each time the user
restart the computer it will loose any memori-
zed credentials.
The user received an email with a link that
goes to a fake site operated by criminals.
Our solution does not protect the activities the
user would do in its host machine, but since
the user has a Firewall, what he could do is to
configure a rule in his host that would block
access to the legitimate bank website. This
way, he would know that if he pressed a link
and that link would show the webpage of his
bank it would be a fake one.
An attacker access the user’s computer and
with the credentials of that user, replace the
LiveCD with one compromised.
This solution does not mitigate physical at-
tacks.
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The user installs a malware or keylogger on
the LiveCD
The LiveCD are secure against this kind of at-
tacks because the user does not have permis-
sion to install programs as root although there
are keylogger for Linux that can run in user
mode. However, this means the user would
have to download it and execute it. Neverthe-
less, the LiveCD should be used only to ac-
cess the online banking and e-commerce web-
sites.
The user installs a malware or keylogger on
the host
This solution is host system independent, the-
refore any virus installed on the host machine
will not affect the LiveCD.
An attacker could do a DNS poisoning attack
against the DNS server used by the user.
The solution does not mitigate this problem.
The attacker could explore a vulnerablity of
the browser on the LiveCD.
The LiveCD should be updated (creating new
LiveCDs) and the user should not go to other
webpages beside the ones for online banking
or e-commerce.
Physical attacks such as replace the LiveCD
with one compromised.
This solution does not mitigate physical at-
tacks.
Table 5.4: Resume of the security problems and how the purposed solution deals with them
This solution has some advantages, comparing with the previous one. The most important
is that it does not rely on the security of the host machine. Even if the computer is full
of virus and malwares, by the fact that we are rebooting and running it with a read-only
bootable medium protects the user from this security problems.
The disadvantages is that managing the master installation and create/distribute the CDs has
an administrative overhead and a cost. Other disadvantage is the fact it requires the user to
reboot the computer and have some specific configuration selected on the BIOS. However,
these disadvantages are small comparing with the security advantages. Perhaps the most
problematic disadvantages of using this solution is if there is no DHCP Server, although
the workaround for this is the user to take note of the network configuration used by the
host operating system and then configure the LiveCD with the same network configuration.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
This thesis is a result of study work about virtual machines, their principal characteristics
and differences, and the security impact of their utilization.
We initially studied the history of the virtual machines, following their evolution from the
origins, in 1960s until nowadays with its implementation in the x86 architecture. We also
presented the different components of virtualization, focusing on the problem of the x86 ar-
chitecture that natively did not support virtualization and how some virtualization software
companies worked around this problem. We have made a study about the current state of
art of the main server virtualization products, describing their principal characteristics and
systems supported.
The use of virtualization brings many advantages, such as reduction of the hardware re-
sources needed with direct impact on cost efficiency, but also security advantages. The
latter benefit is commonly used to spread the word on virtualization, but we wanted to
demystify this myth, presenting some of the security problems that server virtualization
brought and their impact. We choose two of the main server virtualization products com-
monly used by companies and universities and conducted a vulnerability analysis, using as
reference the CVEs reported. The conclusion from that analysis is that both products show
a similar security risk, and they require an extra attention to have their security patches
applied.
Desktop security always brought some concerns to IT administrators and also end users,
which had their computers infected by virus, worms, or their credentials stolen by some
keylogger or phishing attack. We have described some solutions to this problem, using
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virtualization. The first solution presented is based on type 2 hypervisor. The user creates
and customizes three different virtual machines using SUSE Studio, following some steps
described. At the end, the user will have three different VMs, which can use for critical
operation that requires isolation but also secure environments. For this, the user will use
one of the VM which we designated as Red VM that will be used for online banking only.
For operations such as e-Commerce or consulting stock market websites, it will be used a
Yellow VM. A third VM is created with the purpose to be used for operations considered
unsafe such as webmail access (e.g. yahoo, hotmail) or online games. Taking advantage
of using virtualization, we have the guarantee of isolation and therefore, each VM will
not affect the others, neither the host machine, and this way, we have a private isolate
environment that we will use. A functionality available on the hypervisor software we will
use is the possibility to create snapshots of the virtual machines. This allows the user to
have a clean environment each time it starts the VM. The second solution requires the user
to reboot its machine and run a read-only bootable media. In this scenario, virtualization
would be used to maintain a master version of the bootable media installed within a virtual
machine, which allows to be updated, and this way create new versions of the read-only
bootable media with the last updates applied. It was done a security analysis, describing
how the solution can mitigate some of the security problems faced by a user.
I believe that, in a near future, virtualization will start being regarded as a desktop security-
enabling technique rather than just a server workload consolidation mechanism, as it is by
most of the IT community presently. Perhaps, with the commoditization of cloud compu-
ting, we will only have on our desktop computer a virtualization layer that would interact
with our desktop hardware and a desktop VM that would be on some cloud computing.
The future will tell us how right can be this idea.
6.2 Future Work
6.2.1 Virtual Machine Security
One of our goals was to do a security analysis of VMware ESXi using a tool called PRE-
DATOR [91]. VMware ESXi provides a management console accessed by the VMware
vSphere Client using HTTPS. We have eavesdropped on the communication and did some
analysis of the traffic exchanged between the client and the server, and we detected that the
structure passed is XML. The Listing 6.1 show the initial message exchanged between the
VMware vSphere Client and VMware ESXi.
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☎
Method : GET
URL: / c l i e n t / c l i e n t s . xml
s t a t u s : 200
MIME type XML
Reques t :
"GET / c l i e n t / c l i e n t s . xml HTTP / 1 . 1
User−Agent : VMware VI C l i e n t / 4 . 0 . 0
Host : cmu−pc157
Connec t i on : Keep−Al ive
Response :
"HTTP / 1 . 1 200 OK
Date : Tue , 21 J u l 2009 19 : 39 : 01 GMT
Conten t−Type : t e x t / xml
Conten t−Length : 315
<Conf igRoot >
< c l i e n t C o n n e c t i o n i d =""0000"" >
< au t hdPo r t >902 </ au t hdPo r t >
< ve r s i o n >4 </ v e r s i o n >
< exa c tVe r s i on >4 . 0 . 0 < / ex a c tVe r s i on >
<pa t chVe r s i on >1 . 0 . 0 < / pa t chVe r s i on >
<ap iVe r s i on >4 .0 < / ap iVe r s i on >
<downloadUrl > h t t p s : / / * / c l i e n t / VMware−v i c l i e n t . exe < /
downloadUrl >
</ c l i e n t C o n n e c t i o n >
</ Conf igRoot >"
Listing 6.1: Message exchanged between the VMware ESX and vSphere Client
Our goal was to identify the type of communication used and use PREDATOR in order to
find vulnerabilities on it. However, this tool does not have the HTTPS inspection imple-
mented and therefore was not possible to continue with our experience.
6.2.2 The Virtual Machine Read-Only Bootable Media Solution
The solution presented on 5.2 has the disadvantage of replace the CD each time an update
is necessary. If we could somehow make this update automatically without the replace of
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the read-only medium, it would make the solution almost perfect. The solution that we are
going to describe is called Virtual Machine Read-Only Bootable Media solution and relies
on a VM to boot an update system.
This solution would boot from a LiveCD and the first thing to run would be a Hypervisor,
like Xen, that would then start its own Dom0. This Dom0 would connect to a webserver,
using HTTPS and would compare the version of the guest VM file available on that web-
server with the one it has on the LiveCD. If it is the same or older it would launch the
one it has on the LiveCD, otherwise it would download the new version of the guest VM,
it would validate its integrity, and then it would launch that VM. This file is compressed
and signed by using the Kr of the webserver/company. After download, Dom0 has the Ku
correspondent and so can validate its integrity.
This solution could be used for online banking and this LiveCD could be distributed by the
banks. In Portugal, the majority of the banks use a matrix card to identify the user asking
some random data on that matrix. Instead of printing that matrix on plastic cards, the bank
could use a CD Business Card as the medium for the LiveCD.
The advantage of this solution, as mentioned before is that does not require an update to
the medium CD each time there is new released of the VM. However, the download file
must be small in order to take few seconds to download and does not take many bandwidth
on the bank network. There are some Linux version like TinyCore [92] and KolibriOS [93]
that can provide a small distribution that could have less than 10MB.
An issue regarding this solution could be the download size of the guest VM. Another
problem of this solution is the same of the previous one, because is dependent of a DHCP
server, although there is the workaround of manual network configuration.
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